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The most effective and ethical prosecutor’s office is one where the 
leader sets a tone of ethical behavior, then hires and trains lawyers with 
good character who possess good judgment.  In November 2009, the 
Symposium, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure 
Obligations: What Really Works?, convened at the Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law to explore and identify the best practices that 
lead to such an office.  Participants in the Symposium—including 
representatives from state and federal prosecutors’ offices, defense 
lawyers, judges, legal academics, cognitive scientists, social 
psychologists, doctors, as well as members of the medical and corporate 
risk management fields—took an inter-professional approach to discuss 
the core issues affecting prosecutors’ offices from around the country. 
To structure the discussion in advance of the Symposium 
approximately seventy-five participants were split into six Working 
Groups, each meeting to discuss a core issue.  Every group had a 
reporter and a discussion leader, who circulated to the participants short 
papers setting forth the issues and alternative views.  During the 
Symposium, the groups met for five hours to discuss the issues and to 
try to reach a consensus about particular practices.  The following 
Article presents the findings of each of the six Working Groups. 
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The Parts of this Article correspond to each group’s discussions 
and recommendations.   Part I discusses prosecutorial disclosure 
obligations and practices.  Part II discusses the disclosure process.  Part 
III discusses training and supervision.  Part IV discusses systems and 
culture.  Parts V and VI discuss internal and external regulation, 
respectively. 
 
I.     PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS AND PRACTICES: 
REPORTED BY JENNIFER BLASSER1 
 
This Part summarizes the discussions of the Working Group on 
Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations and Practices.2  Participants in the 
group have practiced in state and federal criminal proceedings in 
jurisdictions across the country and therefore brought varied 
experiences and perspectives to the discussions. 
 
A.     Background 
 
The subject of this Working Group was, in a sense, foundational 
for all of the other Working Groups.  While other groups considered 
what prosecutors’ offices should do to ensure that, in any given case, 
the office discloses what should be disclosed as a matter of law and 
office policy, this group discussed what information, material, and 
evidence prosecutors and their offices should disclose—whether as a 
matter of law, office policy, or individual discretion. 
The group recognized that, at present, prosecutors’ disclosure 
obligations vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and derive from 
various sources.  All prosecutors’ offices are subject to federal 
 
 1 Discussion Leader: Bruce Green, Professor of Law, Fordham Law School; Reporter: 
Jennifer Blasser, Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.  
Other members of the Working Group on Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations and Practices 
included: Hon. Marcia G. Cooke, U.S. District Judge, Southern District of Florida; Patricia Coats 
Jessamy, State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, Maryland; Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Prosecuting 
Attorney, Dayton, Montgomery County, Ohio; John T. Chisholm, District Attorney, Milwaukee 
County, Wisconsin; Alafair S. Burke, Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Faculty Research, 
Hofstra Law School; Paul Fishman, U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey; J. Vincent 
Aprile II, Esq.; Morris “Sandy” Weinberg Jr., Partner, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP; Anthony J. 
Servino, Second Deputy District Attorney, Chief, Appeal and Special Litigation Division, 
Westchester County, New York; Eric C. Rosenbaum, Assistant District Attorney, Chief, DNA 
Prosecution Unit, Special Victims Bureau, Queens County, New York; Anna-Sigga Nicolazzi, 
Assistant District Attorney, Homicide Bureau Chief, Kings County, New York; Gerald B. 
Lefcourt, P.C.; and John Schoeffel, Criminal Defense Practice, Special Litigation Unit, The Legal 
Aid Society. 
 2 The summary does not seek to capture the discussions in the order they occurred but to 
capture the principal points of agreement and disagreement and their bases. 
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constitutional standards (e.g., Brady obligations), which have been 
interpreted differently by different courts.  For state prosecutors, state 
constitutional case law may go beyond the federal constitutional 
minimum.  Additionally, prosecutors are subject to legal obligations 
established by statutes and/or rules of criminal procedure that 
supplement and overlap constitutional obligations.  Court rules, 
including judicially adopted rules of professional conduct,3 are another 
potential source of obligation.  As discussions proceeded, participants 
referred to federal law,4 the law of their home states,5 proposed 
amendments to both federal and state law,6 different offices’ policies, 
and the exercise of individual prosecutors’ discretion. 
Jurisdictions’ statutes and rules call for the disclosure of specified 
documents, physical items, and other information.  For example, in 
Wisconsin, the law requires the prosecution to disclose: written and 
recorded statements of the defendant; written summaries of the 
defendant’s oral statements; the defendant’s criminal record; physical 
evidence and specified other evidence that the prosecution plans to use 
at trial; a witness list and the witnesses’ criminal records; prosecution 
witnesses’ relevant written and recorded statements; expert reports; and 
“[a]ny exculpatory evidence.”7 
The federal constitutional case law generally calls for disclosure of 
material evidence and information favorable to the accused, whether it 
be useful in the defense’s case in chief, for impeachment of prosecution 
witnesses, or for investigation that may lead to favorable evidence.  The 
constitutional obligation is not limited to information that has been 
memorialized or to information in the prosecutor’s immediate 
possession, but extends to certain information possessed by the 
jurisdiction’s law enforcement investigators, including information 
known but not written down.  The boundaries of the Brady decisions are 
uncertain and contested; because of the “materiality” requirement, they 
are not capable of being easily or mechanically applied—particularly if 
a prosecutor intends to disclose only what the law requires and no more.  
 
 3 Examples of these are state rules based on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 3.8(d).  This provision was the recent subject of an ABA ethics opinion.  See ABA Comm. 
on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 454 (2009). 
 4 E.g., Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. 
 5 E.g., MD. R. 4-262, -263, -301; MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW art. 240 
(McKinney 2010); WIS. STAT. § 971.23 (2009). 
 6 See, e.g., AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE OF 
FAVORABLE INFORMATION UNDER FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11 AND 16 
(2003), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=All_Publications&Template
=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=62; JOHN SCHOEFFEL, THE LEGAL AID SOC’Y, 
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY REFORM IN NEW YORK: A PROPOSAL TO REPEAL C.P.L. ARTICLE 240 
AND TO ENACT A NEW C.P.L. ARTICLE 245 (2009), available at http://www.legal-aid.org/media/ 
73762/proposal%20for%20discovery%20reform%20in%20new%20york.pdf. 
 7 WIS. STAT. § 971.23 (2009); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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The discussions took place against the background of current law, as so 
described. 
 
B.     Discussions 
1.     Basic Premises of Prosecutorial Disclosure 
 
Participants took as a given that prosecutorial disclosure is 
necessary to promote the public interest in achieving fair trials and 
reliable outcomes in the criminal justice system.  At bottom, disclosure 
is one way in which prosecutors fulfill their fundamental role as 
“ministers of justice.”  Fair trials and reliable outcomes require that 
defense lawyers serve their own assumed role in the criminal justice 
process—i.e., advising the client; investigating and preparing for trial; 
and, at trial, testing the prosecution’s proof, testing the credibility of 
prosecution witnesses, and offering evidence favorable to the accused.  
Much of the evidence or information that enables defense counsel to 
serve these necessary functions is either uniquely available to the 
prosecutor and other law enforcement authorities or, as a practical 
matter, inaccessible to the defense.  As some recent exoneration cases 
illustrate, erroneous convictions can result when defense lawyers do not 
receive and take advantage of necessary evidence and information in the 
prosecution’s possession.  Thus, prosecutorial disclosure is not a 
“technical” obligation but is generally central to the prosecutor’s 
function and essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice 
process.  These understandings informed the discussions about what 
prosecutors should disclose and when disclosure should be made. 
 
2.     Limits on Disclosure 
 
At the same time, there was broad acknowledgment that, in some 
cases (or types of cases), legitimate considerations weigh against liberal 
disclosure.  For example, witnesses in certain types of cases—such as 
those involving homicides, sexual assault, and domestic violence—may 
risk being physically injured because of their willingness to cooperate 
with law enforcement and/or to testify.  In cases involving gang 
violence, the prosecution’s disclosure of witness lists has sometimes led 
to the dissemination of witnesses’ names throughout their 
neighborhood, thereby adding to the risk.  In some cases, once 
disclosure is made, witnesses must be placed in protective custody; the 
earlier this occurs, the greater the burden on the witness and the 
prosecution, which may have limited resources. 
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In some contexts, disclosure of certain information may lead 
defendants or defense witnesses to contrive or tailor false testimony, as 
might be true if the prosecution were to disclose statements obtained 
from defense alibi witnesses.  In other contexts, administrative or 
financial considerations suggest the need for limiting disclosure.  For 
example, in some white collar cases, disclosure of voluminous 
documents may present administrative or financial challenges to the 
prosecution.  Smaller jurisdictions may have limited available resources 
and access to information, which could in turn affect the timing, if not 
scope, of discovery. 
There was not universal agreement on how frequently these 
concerns arise.  For example, some participants noted that prosecutors 
in various jurisdictions around the country currently provide 
information about witnesses to the defense at an early stage in the 
process, and that there does not appear to be evidence that prosecution 
witnesses suffer greater harm in these jurisdictions than in those in 
which such information is produced much later in the process.8 
It was agreed that as important as these considerations may be, 
they generally relate to a minority of cases.  Therefore, concerns—
although legitimate—about witness safety, false testimony, and similar 
considerations should not be the “tail wagging the dog” when it comes 
to the question of what prosecutors should disclose and when evidence 
and information should be disclosed.  The law and internal policies 
should allow for dealing differently with disclosure in cases where these 
concerns are likely to arise.  As discussed below, a range of viewpoints 
existed regarding precisely how laws and policies should account for 
these concerns. 
 
3.     Scope of Disclosure 
 
A principal subject of discussion was the scope of disclosure: what 
evidence, documents, and information the prosecution should provide 
from the universe of material in the possession of, or available to, the 
prosecutor and other law enforcement authorities. 
In general, participants thought that the kinds of information 
identified in existing disclosure statutes should be disclosed;9 no one 
expressed the view that the current law of her jurisdiction is too 
 
 8 Some members of the group suggested that there should be a formal study regarding the 
impact of early disclosure on witness safety before there is a requirement—in jurisdictions that do 
not currently provide early disclosure of witness information—to disclose witness information at 
an earlier stage of the process. 
 9 E.g., MD. R. 4-262, -263, -301; MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW art. 240 
(McKinney 2010); WIS. STAT. § 971.23 (2009). 
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demanding.  Thus, it was agreed that the defense should generally be 
provided (among other things): witnesses’ names and statements; police 
reports relating to the case; forensic evidence, scientific reports, and 
expert reports; defendants’ statements and access to their property; 
pretrial identification evidence; relevant tapes and recordings; 
impeachment information relating to prosecution witnesses, including 
information about inducements provided to prosecution witnesses, their 
prior bad acts, and their inconsistent statements; subpoenas,10 grand jury 
minutes, and search warrant affidavits.  Many, but not all participants 
took the view that as an ordinary matter, witnesses addresses should 
also be turned over. 
Much of the discussion focused on how much more should be 
disclosed than typical laws currently require.  Ultimately, the group 
reached consensus around a general principle that would be subject to 
exception in particular cases, or classes of cases.  (In those cases, there 
are particular concerns—such as witness safety and preventing witness 
perjury—that justify limitations on the ordinary scope of discovery.)  
The principle was that, subject to exception, prosecutors should disclose 
all evidence or information that they reasonably believe will be helpful 
to the defense or that could lead to admissible evidence.11  The idea was 
not that laws would necessarily codify this principle, but insofar as the 
law falls short, prosecutors would give effect to this principle as a 
matter of internal policy. 
There was no agreement on precisely how far the law should go to 
conform to the general principle of liberal disclosure.  Some expressed 
concern that such a broad principle, if codified in the law, would place 
too much authority in judges’ hands,12 while others responded that over-
reliance on individual prosecutors’ discretion could lead to excessive 
variation and an unduly conservative approach to discovery by many 
individual prosecutors. 
Insofar as disclosure obligations are determined by law rather than 
internal policy, there was a preference for the development of a detailed 
statutory framework—one that streamlines discovery and makes explicit 
exactly what should be turned over—even if the statute (or rule of 
procedure) does not establish, and perhaps cannot be perfectly drafted to 
establish, the full limit of a prosecutor’s legal duties.  Correspondingly, 
 
 10 Some members of the group expressed the opinion that this should be limited only to 
information gained from subpoenas duces tecum. 
 11 The group discussed whether prosecutors should also disclose all evidence or information 
that would support a suppression motion based on constitutional grounds, but no consensus was 
reached on this question. 
 12 One participant expressed concern that courts would take overly broad approaches to 
evidentiary admissibility and, on that basis, order the production of information—such as 
embarrassing personal information about sexual assault victims—that legitimately should be kept 
confidential. 
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there was also broad agreement that the constitutional and statutory law 
should not be read to curtail what prosecutors disclose.  Given the 
prosecution’s role of promoting fair trials and just outcomes, there will 
often be a need for policies that call for additional disclosure as a matter 
of self-regulation as well as for the prudent exercise of discretion by 
prosecutors individually. 
 
4.     Witness Statements 
 
With respect to legal obligations, considerable discussion was 
devoted to the disclosure of witness statements.  The group agreed that 
statutes were too narrow insofar as they ordered the production only of 
statements of witnesses whom the prosecution intended to call as 
witnesses.  Many, but by no means all participants took the view that in 
general, the prosecution should disclose the statements of all individuals 
with relevant, and potentially useful information.  Further, it was agreed 
that disclosure should not be limited to recorded and transcribed 
statements or to formal reports of witnesses’ statements, and that in 
some cases, unrecorded statements should be disclosed. 
There was general agreement that as to potential prosecution 
witnesses, the following should be disclosed: (1) investigators’ 
summary notes as well as reports of the witnesses’ statements, (2) 
witnesses’ exculpatory statements, and (3) witnesses’ prior statements 
and omissions that are inconsistent with their expected trial testimony 
and, hence, useful for impeaching the witnesses on cross-examination.  
Many but not all participants agreed that there should also be disclosure 
of statements and investigators’ notes relating to potential defense 
witnesses. 
The group did not agree that prosecutors (as distinct from 
investigators) should generally be required to disclose their notes of 
meetings with witnesses.  However, there was a strong view that, in the 
very least, the prosecutor should disclose when and where meetings 
with prosecution witnesses took place, so that the discussions could be 
explored in cross-examination.  Some argued that prosecutors should 
disclose their notes to ensure that the defense received all of the 
witnesses’ exculpatory and impeaching statements, but countervailing 
concerns included: prosecutors’ notes might contain work product (e.g., 
prosecutors’ mental processes), which should be kept confidential, a 
disclosure obligation might discourage note-taking or motivate 
prosecutors to write elliptical notes, and prosecutors’ notes may be 
inaccurate. 
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5.     “Open File” Discovery 
 
Several prosecutors in the group worked in offices that (subject to 
some limitations and exceptions) provided as a matter of policy for 
“open file” discovery—i.e., for disclosure of all the documents in the 
prosecutor’s individual case file.  They expressed satisfaction with this 
approach. 
Other participants, but not all, supported this approach, while 
recognizing that the concept requires elaboration and does not fully 
capture what ought to be disclosed.  For example, the general concept 
does not specify what information in the possession of the police or 
other authorities should be included in the prosecutor’s case file (or how 
the prosecutor should learn of, and gain access to, information outside 
the prosecutor’s current possession).  However, the concept that 
prosecutors, other than in exceptional cases, should disclose relevant 
information, rather than making individual judgments about what 
particular information in their file is or is not useful to the defense, was 
consistent with the broad principle on which the group ultimately 
agreed: The prosecution should generally provide information useful to 
enable defense counsel to assess the case, counsel the defendant, 
investigate, prepare for trial and, if the case goes to trial, effectively 
present the best available defense and put the prosecution to its proof. 
 
6.     Timing of Disclosure Generally 
 
There was wide agreement among the group that the eve of trial is 
not the appropriate time to provide discovery and that, in the very least, 
Brady material should be disclosed as soon as it is known by the 
prosecutor.  One participant observed that a prosecutor should never be 
in the position of having to explain to a judge how long Brady material 
has been in the prosecution’s file and why it was not turned over sooner. 
Ultimately, the group agreed on a principle regarding the timing of 
disclosure: As an ordinary matter, and subject to exception, prosecutors 
should disclose evidence and information as early as practicable.  This 
would mean making disclosure of then-available material soon after 
arraignments on misdemeanors and after indictment on felonies so the 
defense can investigate, prepare the case, and counsel the client 
appropriately.  The group also agreed that this should be a self-
executing obligation, not one dependent on a request by defense 
counsel. 
The group acknowledged, however, that considerations such as 
witness safety and preventing perjury should limit ordinary expectations 
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that disclosure be made early in the proceedings.  Additionally, several 
participants maintained that the timing of prosecutors’ disclosure was 
interrelated with the timing of defense disclosure—a subject slated for 
discussion at a follow-up conference—and that requirements relating to 
reciprocal discovery might therefore inform the applicable laws and 
policies. 
 
7.     Justified Limits on the Scope and/or Timing of  
Disclosure in Appropriate Cases 
 
In light of the group’s recognition that the general principles 
favoring broad and early disclosure must be limited in appropriate cases 
in light of countervailing law-enforcement concerns, time was devoted 
to the question of how these concerns should be given effect.  In 
particular, the group focused on the concern for witness safety, which 
was generally regarded as the most pressing of these concerns, but this 
was not regarded as the only consideration justifying limits on the scope 
or timing of disclosure. 
The group discussed, without reaching agreement on, several 
possible approaches.  One would be to require prosecutors to obtain a 
protective order in situations where an exception should be made to 
otherwise broad and/or early disclosure obligations.  Many favored this 
solution; but some responded that it was not necessarily feasible for the 
prosecution to obtain a protective order for a witness at an early stage 
given the limited resources of many prosecutors’ offices.  An alternative 
would be for laws and office policies to limit the extent of discovery, or 
to authorize disclosure to be delayed in certain identifiable categories of 
cases (e.g., those involving allegations of violence).  Another would be 
for laws and office policies to give prosecutors discretion to decide on a 
case-by-case basis when it was legitimate to depart from the ordinary 
requirements, while perhaps making the prosecutor’s decision judicially 
reviewable on application of the defense.13  
 
8.     Scope and Timing of Disclosure in the Context of  
Plea Negotiations 
 
The group discussed the recent American Bar Association (ABA) 
ethics opinion interpreting ABA Model Rule 3.8(d)14 to require 
prosecutors to disclose favorable evidence and information to the 
 
 13 Possibly, the ideal approach would differ depending on the jurisdiction. 
 14 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2006). 
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defense prior to a guilty plea.15  The discussion focused on the aspect of 
the opinion concluding that the ethical duty of disclosure was non-
negotiable. 
In general, participants agreed that Brady material that tended to 
negate the guilt of the accused (as distinguished from impeachment 
material) should be disclosed before a guilty plea, and that prosecutors 
should not require defendants to forgo the right to receive this 
information in exchange for a lenient plea agreement.  Many disagreed 
with the ABA opinion, however, insofar as it suggested that before 
accepting a guilty plea, prosecutors should be obligated to comply with 
all of the ordinary disclosure obligations established by constitutional 
cases, statutes, and rules. 
There was not sufficient time to fully discuss and seek agreement 
on precisely what information a defendant might legitimately be asked 
to forgo as part of a plea bargain.  A consideration raised in arguing for 
broader pre-plea disclosure was the difficulty of providing competent 
advice to the defendant about whether to plead guilty in the absence of 
disclosure.  Several countervailing considerations were identified, 
however.  These included the administrative difficulty, particularly in 
jurisdictions with a high volume of criminal cases, of providing the full 
disclosure that would be expected prior to trial; the unfairness to the 
defendant who might have to remain incarcerated while the prosecution 
accumulated and produced information, when that defendant might 
otherwise be able to resolve the charges in a manner providing for 
release from incarceration; and the unfairness to the defendant who 
would be offered a favorable early resolution of the charges either 
because the prosecution was not yet aware of the actual strength of its 
case or because the prosecution seeks to conserve resources, when that 
benefit might be lost if the prosecution had to make full disclosure. 
 
 15 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 454 (2009). 
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C.     Recommendations and Conclusion 
 
Given the limited amount of time for discussion, substantial 
ground was covered, a fair amount of agreement was reached on a 
general level, and areas of disagreement, worthy of further and more 
detailed discussion, were identified.  Not all of the agreement seemed 
obvious or inevitable at the outset.  While there were areas of strong 
disagreement as well, it was often possible to narrow the extent of the 
initial disagreement, and there were some basic issues on which broad 
or unanimous agreement was reached.  The latter included the 
following: 
• Scope of disclosure: As a general principle, but subject to 
exceptions, prosecutors should disclose all evidence or 
information that they reasonably believe will be helpful to the 
defense or that could lead to admissible evidence. 
• Timing of disclosure: Additionally, as a general principle, 
prosecutors should disclose evidence and information as soon as 
practicable. 
• Limits on the scope and timing of disclosure: Various legitimate 
considerations justify limitations on these two general 
principles.  Chief among these are concerns about protecting 
witnesses from intimidation or harm and preventing perjury.  
Limitations and exceptions should be provided in specific cases 
or categories of cases where the harms are more likely. 
• Disclosure as a matter of policy and discretion: Existing 
constitutional and statutory obligations generally define the 
minimum of what should be disclosed, but they do not fully 
capture the general principles that ought to govern the scope and 
timing of prosecutorial disclosure.  Therefore, prosecutors’ 
disclosure should not, as a matter of principle, be limited to 
what the law of the particular jurisdiction requires at the 
particular moment in time.  Rather, prosecutors should adopt 
and implement internal (although not legally enforceable) 
policies governing disclosure to conform disclosure practices to 
what, as a matter of principle, ought to be disclosed. 
• Disclosure laws: Laws adopted to govern prosecutors’ 
disclosure obligations should ideally be clear and conducive to 
ease of administration. 
The discussions reflected the utility of bringing together lawyers 
with experiences in diverse jurisdictions and areas of criminal justice 
practice to explore differences and seek common ground. 
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II.     THE DISCLOSURE PROCESS: REPORTED BY  
KEITH A. FINDLEY16 
 
The Working Group on the Disclosure Process was charged with 
considering how best to structure the procedures for disclosing to the 
defense all Brady17 material and other information appropriate for 
disclosure.  The Working Group did not address what information 
prosecutors should disclose to the defense, but how to ensure that, 
whatever the scope of the disclosure obligation or commitment, it is 
effectuated.  The Working Group took it as a given—or perhaps more 
accurately, as a matter for discussion by other Working Groups—that 
prosecutors will disclose appropriate information to the defense.  
Accordingly, the Working Group focused on policies and procedures to 
ensure that prosecutors receive all relevant case information from police 
so that they can comply with their disclosure obligations or 
commitments.  In a nutshell, the Working Group focused largely, 
although not exclusively, on how to facilitate communication between 
police and prosecutors to ensure full access to disclosable information. 
 
A.     Ensuring Full Flow of Information from Police to Prosecutors 
1.     The Need for Formal Policies and Procedures 
 
At the outset, the Working Group agreed on the principle that there 
should be a full flow of case information from police to prosecutors, so 
that prosecutors can ensure that they comply with their Brady 
obligations. Without access to full investigative information, 
prosecutors, who are charged under Brady with identifying and 
disclosing all exculpatory information in the state’s possession, cannot 
meet that responsibility.  Moreover, as the prosecutors in the Working 
Group noted, it is in law enforcement’s interest to ensure the complete 
 
 16 Discussion Leader: Brandon L. Garrett, Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia 
School of Law; Reporter: Keith A. Findley, Clinical Professor of Law, The University of 
Wisconsin Law School.  Other members of the Working Group on the Disclosure Practice 
included: Rick Jones, Executive Director, Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem; Irving 
Cohen, Esq.; Carlos F. Acosta, Deputy State’s Attorney, Office of the State’s Attorney for Prince 
George’s County, Maryland; Adrian Wagner, James Mintz Group, Inc.; John Bradley, District 
Attorney, Williamson County, Texas; Sue Ellen Bienenfeld, Office of the Kings County District 
Attorney, Brooklyn, New York; Lou Reiter, Former Deputy Chief, Los Angeles Police 
Department; Jessica Roth, Visiting Assistant Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; 
Seymour W. James, Jr., Attorney-in-Charge of the Criminal Practice of The Legal Aid Society in 
New York City; and Christopher D. Chiles, Prosecutor, Cabell County, West Virginia. 
 17 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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flow of information to prosecutors; in these prosecutors’ experiences, 
the vast majority of the time the failure to turn over information hurts 
the prosecution more than the defense because the withheld information 
is most often not Brady material, but inculpatory information that the 
State would like to use in its case.  Accordingly, the Working Group 
further agreed that it is important that each prosecutorial and police 
jurisdiction adopt formal policies and procedures to ensure the full and 
prompt flow of information from police to prosecutors.18 
The Working Group recognized that very different procedures are 
followed in small as opposed to large jurisdictions, and that the 
appropriate policies and procedures will vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.  In New York City, for example, the criminal complaint is 
drafted by prosecutors, so police must come to the prosecutors for initial 
charging.  Prosecutors in New York, therefore, have the ability to insist 
that police bring all relevant investigative material with them when they 
seek the filing of a complaint.  But that is only possible because 
prosecutors’ offices in New York have attorneys on duty twenty-four 
hours per day, seven days per week.  Smaller jurisdictions obviously 
cannot utilize such a procedure.  And even in New York, the 
information provided to prosecutors for drafting the complaint is not 
exhaustive under present practice.  Additional procedures to ensure a 
full flow of information from police to prosecutors are needed. 
In most smaller jurisdictions, prosecutors are not on call to draft 
and file initial charging documents, so police go to a low level 
magistrate to issue charges.  Accordingly, there is little opportunity in 
such systems for prosecutors to insist on production of the full 
complement of case-related documents at the time of charging.  In many 
jurisdictions, there is no formal mechanism for ensuring that all case-
related documents and materials are provided to prosecutors.  Often, the 
procedure is informal, based upon implicit understandings and 
expectations.  And even then, prosecutors often do not receive copies of 
all information developed by police.  For example, even where 
prosecutors make it clear that they need to receive videos from cruiser 
cams, the experience in some jurisdictions is that police typically 
provide only one video—even if multiple squad cars were involved, 
each with their own squad cams, creating multiple videos with 
potentially unique information on each. 
 
 18 At least one state, Illinois, by law requires that “[t]he State should ensure that a flow of 
information is maintained between the various investigative personnel and its office sufficient to 
place within its possession or control all material and information relevant to the accused and the 
offense charged.”  ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412(f). 
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2.     Case Information Checklists 
 
The Working Group reached consensus that, to redress these 
inadequacies in current practice, each jurisdiction should adopt a rule 
requiring the use of checklists to ensure full and timely transfer of all 
relevant information from police to prosecutors.19  Under that rule, as 
soon as a prosecutor becomes involved in a case, that prosecutor should 
provide the checklists to each police agency involved in an investigation 
related to that case.  Those checklists would require police and 
prosecutors alike to ensure that all of the types of information required 
by the checklist are in fact provided to the prosecutors.  If, upon 
completion of the checklist, prosecutors determine that they have not 
received everything that should be provided, prosecutors should then 
submit a formal request to police—a “homework assignment” as one 
prosecutor in the group described it—memorializing the additional 
information the prosecutor needs from the police.  The Working Group 
further agreed that, thereafter, once a prosecutor has become involved in 
the case, the policy should require that, if police generate any new 
investigative report in the case, they must simultaneously send the new 
report to the prosecutor.20 
This recommendation for use of checklists grew from several 
considerations.  First, the Working Group benefited from presentations 
by experts in other fields that deal with information and risk 
management.  Dr. Gordon Schiff,21 for example, explained that, in the 
medical field, significant advances have been made in managing the risk 
of diagnosis errors in hospitals by shifting from a focus on individual 
human errors (special cause variation), to a focus on redressing systemic 
problems that permit such errors (common cause variation).  Dr. Schiff 
drew extensively on developments in Continuous Quality Improvement 
approaches to reducing errors, which emphasize that improved 
performance is generally best fostered by creating systems that provide 
 
 19 The use of discovery checklists garnered considerable support from several of the other 
Working Groups.  See infra Part IV.B.3 (Working Group on Systems and Culture) (discussing the 
use of checklists in written guidance memoranda provided by prosecutors to promote a culture of 
better disclosure in their offices); infra Part V.A.3 (Working Group on Internal Regulation) 
(supporting the use of discovery checklists as a regulatory device); infra Part VI.B.7 (Working 
Group on External Regulation) (supporting “unanimously . . . the idea of checklists” for 
prosecutors to detail what is being disclosed and “a privilege log that lists what is withheld”). 
 20 The Working Group noted that, to the extent the technology is available, supplemental 
reports can and should be automatically transferred electronically to the prosecutor assigned to 
the case.  Even if electronic transfer options are not available—and they should be in most cases, 
given that the technology can be as simple as emailing the reports—the rules ought to require at 
least that hard copies of any new reports be transferred promptly to the prosecutor. 
 21 Dr. Gordon Schiff, Associate Professor of Medicine, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, 
Harvard Medical School. 
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support for performing a job correctly, rather than utilizing a threat of 
punishment for poor performance. 
Under this analysis, a formalized checklist can be an important tool 
to support police and prosecutors in performing their responsibilities for 
sharing information.  A checklist can be understood as a tool that serves 
not as a threat of punishment for failure to perform, but as a supportive 
guide that helps police identify and transfer all required information.  
The use of a formal checklist can be something that police can accept if 
they are trained to understand that completing the checklist will help 
them do their job more professionally and completely. 
Second, and in a related way, police experts in the Working Group 
noted that police generally want to do a good job, and that, because 
police tend to be rule driven, formal rules can help them in their efforts 
to do a good job.  Police are greatly assisted by having clear 
expectations and written rules.  To aid in this process, prosecutors can 
and should make clear to police what their investigative files should 
look like, and should then provide feedback to police on their 
compliance.  Thus, even with a checklist, training by prosecutors 
followed by audits of police compliance are important to the success of 
any information sharing system.  The sense of the Working Group was 
that if prosecutors lay out their expectations in writing and through 
training, give police guidance on how to comply, and then audit police 
work, police will respond appropriately.  Indeed, the Working Group 
noted that police are accustomed to working with checklists in other 
areas of their work; they can accept them and utilize them effectively in 
this aspect of their work as well. 
Third, in suggesting the use of record-keeping and discovery 
checklists, the Working Group also drew on information presented 
about cognitive biases that can impede effective investigations and 
appropriate responses to disclosure obligations.  Dr. Maria Hartwig,22 
for example, explained that psychological factors that produce tunnel 
vision can impede the ability of investigators to recognize exculpatory 
evidence, and can ultimately contribute to miscarriages of justice.  
Cognitive distortions such as confirmation bias, asymmetrical 
skepticism, mistaken beliefs about the indicators of and ability to assess 
the veracity and credibility of suspects and witnesses, and biased 
hypothesis testing, can all lead to investigative failures and disclosure 
errors.  Objective, formalized checklists can impose an external 
structure on the recording and compilation of case information, and 
thereby help police overcome these inherent cognitive biases.  In this 
way, tools such as checklists can help police do their job, not only with 
 
 22 Maria Hartwig, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal 
Justice. 
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regard to meeting their disclosure obligations, but also in terms of 
building stronger cases. 
Finally, the Working Group took note that prosecutors’ offices in 
some jurisdictions have already begun employing some forms that could 
be adapted to become complete disclosure checklists.  The experience 
with these forms demonstrates that this approach is workable.  Prince 
George’s County, Maryland, for example, currently uses a formal 
charging memo, which essentially serves as an information checklist.  
Such a form with little additional effort could be adapted to become a 
checklist of the sort envisioned by the Working Group.  In Oregon, a 
new paperless file system will allow scanning of documents and coding 
them to identify what kind of record they are, and whether they have 
been disclosed to the defense.  This kind of electronic file management 
system has the potential to facilitate creation and use of an electronic 
checklist.  The Multnomah County, Oregon, District Attorney’s Office 
goes a step further in major homicide cases.  In such cases, one person 
is responsible for maintaining a Homicide Major Crimes Discovery 
Assignment form, designed to ensure that job tasks, performance 
standards, and due dates are all met on all matters related to discovery.  
While such an approach cannot be implemented in all cases, it works 
well in big cases. 
The Working Group also recognized that each jurisdiction will 
likely need to develop more than one checklist.  Different checklists 
would probably be required for different kinds of crimes, because 
different crimes—robberies, homicides, sexual assaults, burglaries, 
etc.—might require attention to different types of evidence and 
information.  Likewise, separate checklists might be appropriate for 
distinct types of witnesses.  A case involving an informant or a jailhouse 
snitch, for example, might uniquely require inquiry into information 
such as prior cases in which the witness acted as an informant, prior 
deals bestowed upon the witness in other cases, prior record and 
dispositions in earlier cases, any recorded communications between the 
informant and others, and other such information related to the 
witness’s incentives and veracity. 
Cases involving potential electronic data can also trigger the use of 
technology-focused information checklists.  Such checklists can be 
developed to help answer questions about how useful and accessible 
various types of electronic data can be.  For example, significant GPS 
and mapping data can be developed from cell phones and digital 
cameras, which can help pinpoint the location of a call or a photograph.  
Technology specialists have already developed lists of various types of 
electronic devices and software, which describe how they operate, what 
kinds of data can be retrieved from them, and how to extract their data.  
Such checklists could be very useful in developing discovery checklists 
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that simultaneously assure appropriate flow of information to 
prosecutors and the defense, while also helping police investigators 
focus and enhance their investigations. 
The Working Group considered how such a checklist-based system 
could be fostered in the United States.  While individual prosecutors 
will want to work jointly with police and defense attorneys in their 
jurisdictions, the Working Group also concluded that the process could 
be facilitated if a group of experts were to develop a set of model 
checklists at the national level, much like a model code.  If these model 
checklists were produced by a respected group of experts and of high 
quality, they could then be tailored by local prosecutors’ offices to meet 
local circumstances and incorporate local terminology.  Development of 
these checklists would require prosecutors to work jointly with 
investigators who regularly handle the kinds of cases at issue.  The 
Working Group also concluded that the discussions should include 
defense attorneys to help identify what they think should be included as 
Brady material.  The Working Group recognized that prosecutors would 
eventually confront defense demands for information in their cases, so it 
would make sense and be most efficient to consider those demands up 
front, when developing the discovery checklists. 
The Working Group also generally agreed that the checklists 
should be publicly available, so that defense attorneys would know what 
kind of information is generally collected under the checklists.  At the 
same time, the Working Group thought it important to keep in mind that 
the checklists should be designed to include all information that the 
prosecutor needs to know about a case, but would not necessarily define 
the scope of the information that the prosecutor would in turn be 
obligated to turn over to the defense. 
 
3.     Information Recording Requirements 
 
The Working Group recognized that a significant barrier to full 
transfer of information from police to prosecutors, and then from 
prosecutors to the defense, is that important information sometimes is 
simply never recorded.  The problem was noted in both police 
departments and prosecutors’ offices.  Too often, police fail to make a 
report or other record of information they receive on a case—from 
hotline tips that are not pursued to interviews or canvasses that produce 
no apparently incriminating evidence against a suspect.  Likewise, 
prosecutors in the group noted that police frequently contact prosecutors 
with questions about an investigation, and talk with whomever answers 
the phone.  Often, prosecutors fail to put information about such calls in 
their files.  If such information were in prosecutors’ files, it could serve 
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as another check that prosecutors could reference to make sure that they 
have received all of the follow-up police reports in a case.  The 
Working Group generally acknowledged the need for procedures to 
ensure more complete recording of all such case information. 
The Working Group noted that many crime laboratories have 
found a way to achieve fairly complete record-keeping.  Crime 
laboratory files often include detailed notes about every step in the lab’s 
forensic analyses, as well as notes of every communication with anyone 
(including police, prosecutors, and defense attorneys) about the case.  
The rules and the cultures of these laboratories have made this possible.  
Some in the Working Group thought that police cannot be as thorough 
in their record-keeping, because they work in the field, while lab 
analysts work in the laboratory with easy access to the files.  But others 
in the group thought that police can be just as thorough—even if it 
means initially recording their activities on paper work logs in the 
field—and that they would comply if the rules, and the culture, clearly 
required it. 
The Working Group noted that some police utilize an investigative 
chronology or investigator’s overview—a document that records all 
activity on the case.  The Working Group expressed general agreement 
that rules should require recording all case activity on such a log. 
Police need to understand that they must write down even negative 
results from their investigations.  For example, police must understand 
that, if they canvassed a neighborhood and found no one who saw the 
defendant or the perpetrator in the area, that kind of information is 
important and must be recorded.  Recording such information is 
important both because it might indeed be meaningful Brady material, 
and because recording that information can prevent the waste of time 
occasioned when investigators, unaware of the earlier investigative 
efforts, go back and talk to witnesses who have nothing to report.  In 
this way, full reporting of all case information helps police and 
prosecutors do their jobs more efficiently. 
The Working Group agreed that getting police to record all such 
information, including information that might not be of obvious 
importance at the time, will require procedures and tools that make it 
easy for police to do a full and complete job of recording information.  
Again, the Working Group believed that specific checklists can be 
helpful to guide police in making judgments about what to record.  
Investigative checklists can be designed to ensure full recording of 
information by including specific requirements for recording 
information relating, for example, to all tips received, all persons 
interviewed, all canvasses conducted, all identification procedures 
conducted and witness responses (including failures to identify 
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anyone),23 and the names of all officers present and involved at any 
stage of an investigation, among others.  The checklist can also require 
that police turn over all “scratch notes”—that is, all notes taken in the 
field. 
 
4.     Compliance Audits 
 
As noted, some in the Working Group observed that, to be 
effective, checklists should also be followed by audits that examine the 
extent to which police have met their information-sharing obligations.  
While no formal consensus on this point was expressed, the Working 
Group responded generally favorably, and without stated objection, to 
the suggestion that police should randomly select cases for audits by 
prosecutors’ investigators.  Aside from identifying cases in which police 
failed to provide full disclosure of relevant case information, such audits 
can be important tools for changing the culture in police departments.  
Letting police know that there will be random audits for compliance 
with recordkeeping and information sharing responsibilities is a way to 
emphasize to police that this responsibility is important.  It is a way to 
push police beyond being motivated merely to get their “arrest stat.” 
 
5.     Pretrial Discovery Conferences or Certification 
 
The Working Group also recognized that ensuring a flow of all 
relevant and appropriate information from police to prosecutors, and 
then from prosecutors to the defense, can be facilitated by involving 
courts in the process.  Massachusetts, for example, has a rule that 
requires a conference before trial to ensure that all discovery obligations 
have been satisfied.24  Such a conference serves as a reminder to 
prosecutors and police to double-check their due diligence to obtain and 
disclose Brady material.  The Working Group also thought that it is 
important to provide feedback to police about their performance that 
extends beyond case clearance records based on arrest and charging.  
One way to do that might be to require that police, as well as 
prosecutors, participate in pretrial discovery conferences.  In that way, 
police become accountable to the courts, as well as to prosecutors, and 
 
 23 Some states, by law, require that the government disclose to the defense a “summary of 
identification procedures” and all statements made by an identifying witness, e.g., MASS. R. 
CRIM. P. 14(a)(1)(A)(viii), and others have codified detailed identification procedures and record-
keeping requirements for police-conducted identifications, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
284.52(b) (2010); W. VA. CODE § 62-1E-2(a) (2009). 
 24 See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(1). 
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the likelihood of full cooperation and compliance is increased.  As an 
alternative, another possibility considered by the Working Group is a 
requirement that police must sign and file with the court a certification 
that they have exercised due diligence to identify and provide to the 
prosecutor all case-related information. 
 
B.     Special Problems in Maintaining and Sharing Case Information 
1.     Parallel Investigations 
 
The Working Group noted that special challenges to ensuring the 
full flow of potentially relevant case information to prosecutors can 
arise where there are parallel investigations.  By parallel investigations, 
the group meant investigations into separate crimes or separate suspects 
or involving separate investigators, which might be linked in some way, 
such as through a common perpetrator or common witnesses.  
Frequently, the presence of information in one case that is important in 
a parallel case goes unnoticed. 
To address this problem, the Working Group agreed that the 
investigators in related cases should assign sub-case numbers to the 
parallel investigations, so they can be tracked and linked.  New 
technologies can facilitate the sharing of information in parallel 
investigations.  A paperless, electronic environment provides a 
particularly good opportunity for sharing information.  With electronic 
files, prosecutor or police information technology personnel can assign 
linked case numbers to parallel investigations, even if the investigations 
are in different law enforcement jurisdictions.  And the case information 
checklists can be designed to require inquiry into and disclosure about 
parallel investigations.  But of course, these approaches require first that 
the prosecutor be made aware that the investigations are parallel. 
The challenge, therefore, is to find ways to build identification of 
parallel investigations into case information checklists.  Here again, new 
case management technologies have promise.  In Oregon, for example, 
the new paperless case management system includes a case tracking 
system.  Through that system, inputting a victim’s name will identify 
any other cases that also mention that victim.  Effective case tracking 
systems that permit searches for victims, witnesses, and other related 
information across cases, while difficult to develop, can be very 
important. 
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2.     Misdemeanors 
 
The Working Group reached less agreement on how to handle the 
disclosure of information in misdemeanors, as opposed to felonies.  
Some members of the Working Group contended that checklists like 
those proposed above would be less useful in misdemeanor cases than 
felony cases, because misdemeanors typically involve quick 
dispositions, with police reports disclosed early in the process (such as 
at arraignment), and little follow-up.  Others in the Working Group, 
however, contended that, even if punishment in misdemeanors is light, 
misdemeanors can have serious collateral consequences, so early 
discovery is important to help guide the decision whether to plead.  The 
group noted that frequently the information that is disclosed in 
misdemeanors is just a page or two that is comprised of the police 
report.  Disclosing that police report does little to address Brady 
obligations.  The prosecutors noted that, in misdemeanors, they disclose 
Brady material if they know about it, but they rarely even speak with 
the police officers in such cases, and therefore are often unaware of any 
potential Brady material. 
To address these problems, some members of the Working Group 
suggested that it might be possible to build in some of the relevant 
Brady or investigative questions on the arrest sheet filled out by police, 
to help make officers understand that prosecutors need this kind of 
information even in misdemeanors.  The Working Group did not pursue 
the problems in misdemeanors beyond that suggestion. 
 
3.     Prosecutors’ Record-Keeping 
 
The Working Group discussed questions that many prosecutors 
have about whether and how to make a record, or take notes, of witness 
and suspect interviews in which the prosecutors themselves participate.  
The Working Group recognized that many prosecutors are fearful of 
taking notes during such interviews.  But the Working Group generally 
agreed that prosecutors should understand that taking notes during 
interviews is in their interest, because without notes they will not retain 
or recall the substance of those interviews.  The Working Group agreed 
with the experienced prosecutors in the group that prosecutors must 
ensure that someone takes notes during those interviews, and that they 
should address their concerns about note-taking by doing their best to 
make certain the notes are accurate. 
A more difficult question for the Working Group was the issue of 
who should take the notes during a prosecutor-assisted interview.  The 
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problem can be especially difficult if multiple law enforcement agencies 
are involved in the investigation.  Some agencies typically take copious 
notes; others take very few notes.  The group generally agreed that 
prosecutors commonly want one consistent case agent to take notes for 
the group, and that the note-taker should be someone familiar with the 
issues in the case to ensure accuracy.  Some in the Working Group 
suggested that, if such a case agent is not available, then the individual 
prosecutor might want to take the notes, to ensure reliability and 
consistency. 
Finally, the Working Group noted that the Los Angeles District 
Attorney’s Office has a Brady compliance unit that maintains a database 
of problematic witnesses, such as jailhouse snitches and police officers 
who have committed perjury.  The Working Group agreed in general 
that such units can be very helpful, but they obviously require resources, 
which many jurisdictions do not have. 
 
4.     Electronic Recording of Interviews 
 
The Working Group also discussed issues surrounding whether 
witness interviews should be electronically recorded.  In particular, 
some in the group argued that electronic recording is especially 
important with regard to communications with cooperating witnesses.25 
The Working Group did not reach consensus on the question of 
electronic recording.  While all agreed that electronic recording can be 
helpful, some expressed concern that electronic recording might make 
witnesses less forthcoming, and might cause them to hesitate because of 
concern that the defendant would be able to see the recorded interview.  
Others contended, however, that given the ubiquity of video recording 
in our lives today, witnesses are accustomed to and unconcerned about 
recording.  They suggested that witnesses would be no more concerned 
about a defendant seeing their electronically recorded statement than 
about seeing a written report of their statement.  And they suggested 
that the experience with electronic recording of suspects has revealed no 
problems with suspects becoming less forthcoming.  The group noted 
that in some jurisdictions, police record all interviews with witnesses in 
homicide cases. 
 
 25 The Working Group did not specifically address the question of electronic recording of 
custodial interrogations of suspects.  Currently, at least ten states and more than 600 individual 
law enforcement agencies have adopted policies requiring electronic recording of custodial 
interrogations of suspects.  See Thomas P. Sullivan & Andrew W. Vail, The Consequences of 
Law Enforcement Officials’ Failure to Record Custodial Interviews as Required by Law, 99 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 215, 216, 220 n.24 (2009). 
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C.     Ensuring Timely Disclosure of Evidence  
from Prosecutors to the Defense 
 
While the Working Group focused the bulk of its attention on 
procedures to facilitate the flow of information from police to 
prosecutors, it also addressed in less depth some issues related to 
facilitating the disclosure of appropriate information from prosecutors 
to the defense.  Again, the Working Group’s focus was not on what 
should be disclosed, but on how to facilitate the disclosure of 
appropriate information. 
In particular, the Working Group addressed concerns about the 
timing of disclosure of Brady material to the defense.  Some in the 
group argued that prosecutors should turn over all appropriate 
information as soon as they receive it, with the exception of information 
that legitimately poses a risk to witness safety or a risk of witness 
tampering.  The Working Group generally agreed that the names of 
witnesses and information about how to locate them should be disclosed 
well in advance of trial.  There was less agreement about whether the 
substance of witness statements should be disclosed early in the process, 
although the group noted that, in many states, unlike the federal system, 
prompt and full disclosure of witness statements is the rule.  The 
prosecutors in the Working Group suggested that they would be more 
inclined to agree to prompt and full disclosure of witness names and 
statements if the rules imposed reciprocal disclosure obligations.  They 
also expressed skepticism, however, about whether judges do or will 
enforce reciprocal discovery requirements.  And there was disagreement 
among group members, including among prosecutors, about whether 
early disclosure of witness statements leads to changes in witness 
statements between the time of the initial police interview and trial. 
To resolve these matters, the Working Group suggested that 
various jurisdictions might consider experimenting with open and early 
discovery in a small category of cases, and then evaluate those cases to 
determine if such disclosure creates any problems.  Prosecutors in 
Brooklyn reported that they operate under a system of full and early 
disclosure, and they have had no problems with it.  If jurisdictions find 
that the experiment with a few crime categories produces no problems, 
they can then expand the full and early disclosure to other crime 
categories. 
GROUP REPORTS.31-6 8/9/2010  8:51:56 PM 
1984 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 31:6 
 
III.     TRAINING AND SUPERVISION: REPORTED BY STEPHANOS BIBAS26 
 
The Working Group on Training and Supervision addressed ways 
to improve prosecutorial disclosure through improved internal training 
and supervision within prosecutors’ offices.  It sought to develop 
practical recommendations to address the issue.  The goal was to reflect 
on the sources and causes of prosecutorial discovery issues and to offer 
a variety of suggestions for how offices could address and forestall 
these discovery issues. 
 
A.     The Nature of the Issues 
 
To improve discovery, one must first appreciate its shortcomings.  
The group started by trying to characterize the nature and source of 
discovery issues.  Calling prosecutorial discovery a problem, many 
agreed, may be too strong a label.  The word “problem” may imply 
intentional choices not to disclose obviously relevant material.  While, 
on occasion, police and prosecutors do intentionally break the rules, far 
more often discovery violations are probably negligent or inadvertent.  
As long as the law gives prosecutors discretion in deciding what and 
when to disclose, there will be discovery disputes.  Prosecutors’ offices 
must accept responsibility for setting internal disclosure standards, 
training their new hires on those standards, and supervising and 
monitoring compliance with those standards.  Solutions ought to focus 
on raising awareness and implementing safeguards, not simply on trying 
to weed out a handful of rogues or bad apples. 
Every actor in an adversarial system is susceptible to tunnel vision, 
and prosecutors are no exception.  In the heat of adversarial combat, 
prosecutors may see only their own theory of the case, with blinders to 
how defense lawyers might defend the case and put a different spin on 
certain pieces of evidence.  Because they may fail to see some evidence 
 
 26 Discussion Leader: Adele Bernhard, Associate Professor of Law, Pace Law School; 
Reporter: Stephanos Bibas, Professor of Law and Criminology, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School.  Other members of the Working Group on Training and Supervision included: Rachel E. 
Barkow, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Charles E. Clayman, criminal 
defense lawyer, Clayman & Rosenberg LLP; John Wesley Hall, Jr., criminal defense lawyer and 
past President of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Robin M. McCabe, 
Assistant District Attorney, New York County, New York; Hon. Joseph Kevin McKay, Acting 
Justice, Supreme Court, Kings County, New York; Christina E. Miller, Assistant District 
Attorney, Suffolk County, Massachusetts; Kin W. Ng, Director of Training, District Attorney’s 
Office, King’s County, New York; Lois M. Raff, Counsel to the District Attorney, Queens 
County, New York; Richard P. Rosenthal, Chief of Police, Wellfleet, Massachusetts; and Abbe L. 
Smith, former public defender and Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
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as materially favorable to the defense, prosecutors may not realize that 
they have to disclose it.  Heavy workloads and inadequate training and 
supervision can exacerbate the danger, especially for young lawyers and 
for those with no or no recent defense experience. 
Another factor that contributes to discovery issues is that the 
criminal justice system is chronically overtaxed.  Large caseloads mean 
that police officers are extremely busy and may not follow every lead.  
Busy prosecutors likewise may not dig into their files early on to learn 
what information they have or do not have, let alone follow up with 
police to pursue fresh leads and gather available witness statements, 
police reports, and the like. 
A related issue is the failure to memorialize information.  Busy 
police officers may not take good notes, much less audiotape or 
videotape conversations or other evidence.  Busy prosecutors likewise 
may not make good records themselves.  Prosecutors’ offices may be 
spread out, and as they move scattered files around, they may lose or 
mislay them.  Particularly in horizontal-prosecution systems, when each 
prosecutor handles a different segment of the same case, earlier 
prosecutors may not take good notes and put them in the file, leaving 
later prosecutors ignorant of what earlier prosecutors learned.  
Information is especially likely to get lost in big cases, where no one 
person can know everything that has happened. 
A final concern is that discovery rules and standards may be 
unclear.  Prosecutors are expected to know an amalgam of statutes, case 
law, ABA standards, National Prosecution Standards, manuals, and 
local practices and culture, and should receive copies of these materials 
in training.  Standards are broad and cannot possibly answer every 
situation, as the variety of possibilities defies exhaustive categories. 
 
B.     Possible Solutions 
 
Some solutions to discovery issues are general.  Even though rules 
cannot solve every problem, by listing recurring situations and types of 
evidence, rules can get prosecutors to focus.  A useful rule of thumb 
would be, “If in doubt or in a gray area, disclose.”27 This rule of thumb, 
of course, cannot resolve cases in which prosecutors must balance 
disclosure against witness safety, or where a prosecutor simply cannot 
 
 27 Some group members suggested that, at a minimum, prosecutors in doubt should submit 
potentially discoverable material to the court for in camera review.  Others expressed concern 
about whether in camera review would be adequate.  They also emphasized that, to make review 
effective, judges must view the relevance of the evidence from the defense’s perspective.  If 
judges do not disclose the evidence, they should make detailed records under seal, to facilitate 
appellate review. 
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see the defense’s likely theory of the case.  Nevertheless, it might be 
helpful, particularly if coupled with concrete guidance for recurring 
scenarios such as statements of witnesses who are hesitant, change 
significant details, or have cooperation agreements. Prosecutors might 
disclose evidence more fully if discovery were not framed simply as a 
windfall for defendants and an opportunity to blame prosecutors. 
Prosecutors could reframe the issue as not simply about helping 
defendants with exculpatory or impeachment material, and not even just 
a matter of doing justice and being fair, but also about getting all the 
information to make a case and tell a full story.  Seeing the complete 
picture assures prosecutors not only that they are being fair to the 
innocent but also that they have held the guilty responsible.  The failure 
to investigate, unearth, memorialize, and share information prevents the 
prosecution from putting together a complete picture of the inculpatory 
evidence, weakening its case and ability to persuade guilty defendants 
to plead guilty.  By reframing the issue as one of memorializing and 
sharing information more fully, prosecutors’ offices might reduce 
cultural resistance to building better information systems. 
For the most part, the Working Group focused on trying to 
implement these and other solutions at three institutional levels: 
prosecutors’ offices hiring, training, and supervision practices.  A 
discussion of each of these approaches follows. 
 
1.     Hiring and Other Personnel Practices 
 
Hiring is an early and often-overlooked opportunity to improve 
discovery practices.  The hiring process, like voir dire, has two main 
objectives.  The more obvious one is to select good candidates and weed 
out bad ones.  On this aspect, group members expressed skepticism 
about how well prosecutors can screen for unethical or problem 
candidates.  Certainly they can telephone references and look for certain 
qualifications.  For example, it may help to hire a certain fraction of 
former defense lawyers, who may have better perspective on how a 
defense lawyer might use certain evidence and so be more sensitive to 
the need to disclose.  (In Britain, barristers routinely take both 
prosecutions and criminal defense assignments, making it harder for 
them to develop partisan blinders.)  At the interview stage, however, 
candidates are packaged and prepared to say what they think will get 
them hired, not to admit to unethical behavior.  Moreover, few if any 
candidates consciously plan to behave unethically.  As noted above, the 
group was more concerned about negligent rather than intentional 
nondisclosure.  It is hard to forecast who will behave negligently in the 
heat of adversary combat and under the pressure of crushing caseloads. 
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The second, less obvious goal of hiring is to teach a message, 
themes, priorities, and office culture.  The parallel to jury selection is 
instructive: Good trial lawyers use voir dire to begin to instill their 
themes and theory of the case at the very beginning.  In other words, 
prosecutors need to see hiring as a critical training moment, a chance to 
make lasting first impressions.  Thus, the group recommends that 
prosecutors’ offices, in hiring, take steps to communicate the message 
of ethical decisionmaking and erring on the side of disclosure. 
The process of sending a message should begin in law school.  
Professors should teach students about the proper role of prosecutors 
and that doing justice requires more than a narrow or crabbed view of 
discovery obligations.  Law schools need to relay feedback from their 
alumni who are now prosecutors and defense attorneys, and to bring 
them in to address students on the topic of discovery.  Prosecutors’ 
offices should send and reinforce these messages to their legal interns. 
During the hiring process, prosecutors’ offices’ interviews should 
include hypothetical questions about discovery, as many offices already 
do.  Interviewers could send out case law and statutes governing 
prosecutors’ discovery obligations ahead of time and then pose 
hypotheticals during interviews to see how candidates respond.  The 
point of these questions would not be to screen out candidates who 
came up with the wrong answers.  Candidates are likely to be prepared 
and hear about the hypotheticals from fellow candidates, so it may not 
make sense to seek a particular right answer to screen out bad apples.  It 
is more important to ask open-ended questions with no obvious right 
answer and gauge how candidates reason and respond. 
Hypotheticals that involve serious, violent crimes are useful for 
raising the stakes both for disclosure and failure to disclose.  
Interviewers can complicate the scenario by having the prosecutor’s 
supervisor absent.  Another possible twist is to have a mentally unstable 
third party give a questionable confession to a crime and ask candidates 
what they would do with it. 
At the end of the interview, interviewers could conclude with 
statements about how they might approach the issue and how important 
the topic is.  They could also underscore that supervisors and colleagues 
will be there to offer advice and help prosecutors to do the right thing.  
And after candidates were hired, interviewers could solicit feedback 
from candidates about what they thought about the interviewing 
process. 
The main point of these discovery hypotheticals would be to 
communicate the importance of full and fair discovery.  Prosecutors’ 
offices need to develop reputations for ethical decisionmaking, 
reputations that law students will hear about.  By their very questions 
and sustained focus, these inquiries communicate that the office values 
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a thoughtful decisionmaking process, not just right answers.  The focus 
in hiring on ethical disclosure and reputation speaks volumes about 
what the office stands for, far more than a sermon or uplifting speech 
would.  Many group members were struck by how, after a series of 
discovery scandals, the new district attorney in Dallas County focused 
interviews on Brady disclosure obligations and discovery to 
communicate how much he and the office cared about ethical 
discovery.28 
Likewise, making a point of hiring some lawyers with defense 
experience would send an important message that defense lawyers are 
not evil nor the enemy.  Choosing to hire some ex-defenders would both 
rebut that message powerfully and bring in a range of viewpoints. 
Also important are the personnel practices for hiring police 
officers.  The selection process for police officers should emphasize (1) 
investigating to develop relevant information, both before and after 
arrest, (2) reducing that information to writing, and (3) timely disclosing 
that information to prosecutors.  Depending on the police department’s 
internal culture, these steps may be difficult.  Many departments focus 
on the number of arrests as a metric of success.  Refocusing a 
department on gathering and disclosing information may not be easy but 
is worthwhile. 
Other personnel practices could reinforce the pro-discovery 
message.  Awards, plaques, and certificates could formally recognize 
police and prosecutors who do the right thing.29  Rather than simply 
recognizing prosecutors who win trials, supervisors could also praise 
those who turn over evidence even at the cost of dismissing or 
weakening their cases.30  Holding up ethical behavior as a model, even 
 
 28 See Voices from the Field: An Inter-Professional Approach to Managing Critical 
Information, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2037, 2069 (2010) [hereinafter Voices from the Field] 
(presentation by Terri Moore).  Dallas County District Attorney Craig Watkins changed these 
hiring interviews as part of a series of reforms designed to change the culture of his office.  See 
Steve Mills, ‘Smarter Criminal Justice System’; New Dallas County DA Advocates Fairness; 
Democratic Prosecutor Ends Win-at-All-Cost Attitude, Urging DNA Testing and Intervention, 
HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 3, 2008, at B3 (reporting that Watkins changed the culture of the office by 
banishing the “win-at-all-costs mentality” and replacing many prosecutors with new ones of his 
own choosing); Sylvia Moreno, New Prosecutor Revisits Justice in Dallas; District Attorney 
Embraces Innocence Project and ‘Smart on Crime’ Approach, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2007, at A4 
(reporting that Watkins began speaking out against the win-at-all-costs mentality, inviting the 
Innocence Project to review hundreds of convictions for possible DNA testing, and firing or 
accepting resignations from nearly two dozen prosecutors). 
 29 See Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors for Performance, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 
450 (2009). 
 30 One group member noted as an example the Wylie-Hoffert murders in 1963.  In that case, 
the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office dismissed charges against the first accused, George 
Whitmore, that had rested on a false, coerced confession.  That office later successfully 
prosecuted Richard Robles for the murders.  See Selwyn Raab, Parole Action Could Close 
Landmark Murder Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1988, § 1, pt. 1, at 38.  The handling of that case 
became part of the culture of the office; prosecutors glorified the dogged and honest investigative 
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when it undercuts prosecutors’ self-interest in winning convictions, 
would reinforce the message that prosecutors should not win at all costs.  
Likewise, prosecutors’ offices should not only promote prosecutors 
based in part on their ethics, but also tell those promoted and others why 
they are being promoted.  And, in cases involving intentional or 
persistent negligent violations, prosecutors’ offices should stand ready 
to suspend or fire prosecutors to underscore how seriously they take 
discovery violations. 
 
2.     Training 
 
The group agreed on the need for both formal programs and 
informal training on Brady and disclosure.  It rejected the notion, 
advanced by at least one district attorney, that district attorneys may 
rely exclusively on law school training and prosecutors’ own sense of 
ethics as sufficient discovery training.31 
Formal Training.  Prosecutors’ offices in large metropolitan areas 
typically provide in-house training on various aspects of criminal 
practice, including disclosure and ethical obligations.  Organizations 
such as the New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) and the 
National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) already offer training 
programs and simulations.  These and other simulations should be 
offered nationwide over the internet.  Websites can also collect relevant 
discovery case law, statutes, ethical standards, office policies, and the 
like for ready reference.  Smaller offices, with fewer internet resources 
and lacking their own websites, may need to adopt alternative models.32  
They may attend national or state programs and then share what they 
 
work that had dared to challenge the police’s certainty of Whitmore’s guilt. 
 31 Brief for Appellants at 47-48, Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009) (en 
banc) (No. 07-30443), 2007 WL 5110779. 
 32 In New York State, for example, close to a dozen prosecutors’ offices in larger counties 
have full-time training directors.  These training directors conduct extensive, repeated training of 
prosecutors on all aspects of criminal practice, including disclosure and ethical obligations, at 
various points in their careers.  For example, newly hired prosecutors receive one set of training, 
those starting to prosecute felonies receive further training, and those prosecuting advanced or 
specialized cases receive still more specialized training.  In addition, all prosecutors take part in 
monthly continuing legal education programs.  To insure that smaller counties without the 
resources for in-house training directors receive similar training, the NYPTI provides regional 
training on a host of topics throughout the year.  It also operates a summer school on the campus 
of Syracuse University Law School, offering both a basic training course for new prosecutors and 
intensive mini-courses on advanced topics.  To insure that trainers exchange information and 
ideas, the District Attorneys Association of the State of New York established a training 
committee, which reviews training needs and conducts an annual one-day training course.  All of 
these programs contain courses specifically highlighting ethics and disclosure obligations in both 
lecture and demonstration formats, as well as programs focused on the more difficult or nuanced 
ethical and disclosure obligations arising in specialized areas of prosecution, such as white-collar 
crime, domestic violence, and vehicular homicide. 
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have learned with their colleagues back home.  Training programs can 
begin with lectures but should move on to substantive law and factual 
scenarios and test the application of law to facts. 
One particular kind of training that has proven useful in law school 
clinics is the use of television and movie (both feature and documentary 
film) clips.  These can include stories of false confessions, mistaken 
identifications, untruthful informants, police sleight-of-hand, and the 
like.33 
Training needs to go well beyond traditional trial advocacy skills 
of the sort emphasized by the National Institute on Trial Advocacy 
(NITA).  In particular, training must include a specific focus on witness 
preparation of both police and civilian witnesses.  Watching both live 
and videotaped witness preparation sessions can help viewers to spot 
examples of poor practices.  These exercises can train prosecutors to 
question witnesses separately, to avoid leading questions whenever 
possible, and, in appropriate and important cases, to keep witnesses 
apart so that they do not taint one another’s recollections. 
Training can also benefit from having trainers and trainees bring 
their own real cases for discussion.  Illustrating near-misses makes 
discovery issues more concrete, vivid, and clearly important.  Trainers 
can also bring in high-profile cases from their own and other 
jurisdictions.  The story and the amount riding on discovery violations 
can give these examples emotional power.  Also, asking trainees about 
their experiences helps trainers and supervisors to adapt training to meet 
their needs. 
The right trainers make training much more effective.  Trainers 
should be those known for their ethical thoughtfulness and 
communications skills.  Judges are exactly the kind of experienced, less 
partisan lawyers who should be more involved in cultivating and 
educating newer lawyers to see all sides of discovery issues.  Many 
members of the group disagreed with advisory ethics opinions in New 
 
 33 E.g., Homicide: Life on the Street (NBC television broadcast series 1993-1999) (featuring 
intensive police interrogations); Murder on a Sunday Morning (HBO cable television broadcast 
2001) (Academy Award winning documentary about the wrongful prosecution of a fifteen-year-
old black boy for murdering a tourist in Jacksonville, Florida); MY COUSIN VINNY (20th Century 
Fox 1992) (the best courtroom comedy ever, featuring a discovery scene in which Marisa Tomei 
instructs Joe Pesci—her fiancé and a defense attorney—on his right to see the prosecutor’s whole 
file upon request); The Plea (PBS Frontline television broadcast 2004) (documentary about plea 
bargaining, including four stories about defendants who pleaded or refused to plead guilty, some 
of which implicate prosecutorial decision-making); The Practice (ABC television broadcast series 
1997-2004) (featuring ethical dilemmas for prosecutors and defense lawyers); THE THIN BLUE 
LINE (Miramax Films 1988) (Errol Morris’s gripping documentary about a man wrongly 
convicted of murder in Dallas County, Texas); THE WRONG MAN (Warner Bros. Pictures 1956) 
(haunting tale by Alfred Hitchcock based on a true story of a man wrongly accused of robbery). 
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York that have been (over)read to forbid judges to take part in training 
unless it includes both prosecutors and defense lawyers.34 
The timing of training also matters.  Of course training should 
begin when new prosecutors join an office.  But it should also remain 
periodic, perhaps annual or semiannual, throughout a prosecutor’s 
career.  When prosecutors advance to a new unit, such as homicide or 
narcotics, they should receive additional training that highlights 
recurring problems particular to that unit. 
Two special kinds of training deserve separate mention.  First, 
supervisors themselves need training, which should not be limited to 
traditional trial skills.  It needs to emphasize ethics and professional 
development, especially how to supervise and teach.  Supervisors, 
promoted because of their prosecutorial prowess, may not be 
accustomed to managing other prosecutors.  Lawyers may need to learn 
to listen to understand, not just to respond persuasively. 
The other kind of training that is often neglected is training 
prosecutors to deal and communicate with police.  That training needs 
to be practical and task-related.  Young prosecutors must learn 
interviewing skills generally.  They need to learn to begin gathering 
information early, before arraignment.  They must also learn to work 
with police witnesses, with multiple officers, and with multiple 
inconsistent recollections.  They must be prepared to challenge police, 
to break down their conclusions, question their bases, and collect and 
review all documentation.  They need to learn to ask police to 
investigate and follow up additional leads that could confirm or 
undercut guilt.  And, even at the risk of civil liability,35 prosecutors 
should be involved earlier in investigations, interrogation, lineups, and 
witness preparation.  Unless they get involved early on, prosecutors 
may have no idea what discoverable information exists beyond the 
documents in the case file.  On the other hand, prosecutors also need to 
learn to appreciate police caseloads and possible deficiencies in their 
training, so they have a sense of what information they can realistically 
get. 
 
 34 See, e.g., N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 05-134 (2005), available at 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/judicialethics/opinions/05-134.htm.  That opinion wisely 
counsels judges not “to promote a point of view or to support one side in a particular class of 
cases,” as that would “cast doubt on his/her ability to remain impartial in those cases.”  In other 
words, the opinion correctly forbids judges not to become part of the prosecution team or to 
coach them on how to win.  Unfortunately, some lawyers have over-read that and other opinions 
as barring training for prosecutors even on compliance with their legal obligations, unless the 
training also includes defense lawyers.  It is this over-reading to which many group members 
object. 
 35 See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 275-76 (1993) (explaining that when 
prosecutors act as investigators and not advocates, they are entitled not to absolute immunity but 
only to investigators’ qualified immunity); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 496 (1991) (denying 
absolute immunity to prosecutors who give legal advice to police investigators). 
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Police likewise need training to memorialize witness statements 
and to document how they got physical evidence and maintained a clear 
chain of custody.  They need to be trained to report this information to 
prosecutors so that prosecutors can evaluate and disclose it as necessary.  
Police training needs to be practical and focused on the unit’s job or 
task; homicide detectives encounter investigative and discovery issues 
different from those of fraud units. 
Informal Training.  Training is not limited to formal programs such 
as continuing legal education.  Informal training should be a regular part 
of an office’s work.  Supervision in a practical setting offers many 
opportunities for feedback and learning. Mentor programs and 
systematic second-chairing of new prosecutors can encourage feedback.  
Supervisors, mentors, and senior lawyers need to create a safe space that 
allows prosecutors to ask questions and admit mistakes.  All prosecutors 
should be learning from their mistakes.  In that respect, it is important to 
handle acquittals carefully.  On the one hand, acquittals may signal that 
a case should not have been indicted, was prosecuted poorly, or failed to 
consider how required disclosures would ultimately weaken a case at 
trial.  On the other hand, offices should be careful not to stigmatize 
acquittals too much, as they already carry plenty of sting, and it is better 
to lose a case after full disclosure than to win it by withholding 
discoverable evidence. 
One can even think of informal training more broadly.  Many 
management experts suggest creating spaces for employees to talk and 
interact, ranging from inviting lunchrooms and courtyards to water 
coolers and regular happy hours.  These venues and events build 
community and create regular opportunities to solicit and give advice.  
In casually discussing one another’s cases, prosecutors may come to see 
discovery issues and ways of handling them that they had not 
considered on their own.  Developing community is part of fostering an 
office culture that values dialogue and reflection. 
The overall goal is to regularly challenge line prosecutors’ 
assumptions about their cases, to get them and their colleagues to 
question and reflect on their discovery and other decisions.  The goal of 
discussions is to get prosecutors to keep an open mind and revisit their 
conclusions, so that tunnel vision and a conviction mentality do not 
blind them to discoverable evidence. 
 
3.     Supervision 
 
Supervision is another important yet often overlooked tool for 
improving prosecutorial discovery practices.  There are many ways to 
supervise prosecutors.  Supervisors can walk into courtrooms and 
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observe how their prosecutors perform.  They can perform retrospective 
reviews, especially after cases involving acquittals or wrongful 
convictions.  They can schedule regular meeting times with the head 
prosecutor, bureau chiefs, and line prosecutors, as the Queens District 
Attorney’s Office does.  They can spot-check case files and look for 
factors that lead to Brady violations, such as failures to write down 
statements or to secure copies of statements.36  Supervisors and line 
prosecutors can watch videos of how prosecutors perform and critique 
them or use them for training other prosecutors on best practices.  All of 
these are opportunities for supervisors to give cases a fresh look, to 
study near misses and mistakes, and even to randomly audit cases.  
While training on hypothetical and past cases is helpful, there is no 
substitute for monitoring performance in real, ongoing cases. 
One of the main goals of supervision should be to create feedback 
loops, so prosecutors can learn from their successes and their failures.  
But a single superior directly above a line prosecutor has only a limited 
amount of information and can monitor only sporadically.  It would be 
much better to follow the management trend emphasizing 360-degree 
feedback.  That means that feedback should come not only from 
immediate and higher-up supervisors, but also from colleagues, 
subordinates, victims, defendants, public defenders and other defense 
lawyers, judges, and police, even those in other jurisdictions.  Likewise, 
supervisors should receive feedback from their subordinates on how 
they are doing.  Police should receive feedback from prosecutors about 
bad arrests, discovery violations, and flawed interrogations and 
searches. 
Feedback should be standardized, periodic, and routine (after each 
case ends, or every month or two) so that it does not single out 
particular prosecutors for blame.  Routine feedback would allow 
supervisors to check for patterns of problems.  In some situations, 
anonymous feedback might encourage more candor.  Feedback could 
involve an easy, simple system such as eBay’s post-transaction emails, 
asking buyers to rate their sellers on a handful of dimensions and 
provide one or two sentences of specifics. 
For example, district attorneys could regularly meet with judges 
and public defenders.  They could ask head public defenders to identify 
the handful of line prosecutors who have developed reputations for 
being unethical or overly aggressive, not simply for being tough but 
fair.  Supervisors could order the minutes from pre-charge conferences 
and similar stages of trial, to monitor how prosecutors handle difficult 
 
 36 Neither the Constitution nor any statutes or rules of which we are aware require 
prosecutors or police to write down witness statements.  Nevertheless, many group members 
agreed that writing them down is usually the better practice, as it guards against forgetting—and 
thereby increases compliance with disclosure requirements. 
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and contentious issues.  Some of this goes on already, but offices could 
make it more consistent and systematic. 
Feedback from defense lawyers is particularly critical. If 
prosecutors turn over discovery early, the defense can offer feedback 
about what appears to be missing.  Earlier discovery may also lead to 
earlier guilty pleas, offering a tangible benefit for disclosure.  Earlier 
conversations with prosecutors allow defense lawyers to convey their 
theory of the case, which may lead prosecutors to recognize evidence as 
exculpatory or impeaching. 
The broad range of feedback, including supervisors’ own 
comments, can stress the importance of cultivating a reputation for 
ethical, trustworthy behavior. Unless they receive feedback, prosecutors 
may have little idea of how others perceive them. 
To facilitate supervision, prosecutors need to document their 
decisions.  Putting charging decisions, plea bargains, cooperation 
agreements, and the like in writing opens them to review.  Prosecutors 
should check to see whether police are writing up witness statements, 
disclosing those statements, following domestic-violence checklists, and 
the like.  Decisions that are not documented in writing can fall through 
the cracks, particularly as cases move from one prosecutor to another. 
Other police and prosecutors within an office also play important 
supervisory roles.  Line assistants and police officers should have ready 
access to a trusted expert who is open to assisting them with discovery 
questions large and small.  Offices should protect and encourage 
whistleblowers, so that anyone who learns of possible discovery 
violations feels free to report them anonymously.  They could also set 
up anonymous tip lines, so that prosecutors, police, defense lawyers, 
victims, and defendants could report complaints for supervisors to 
consider. 
 
C.     Conclusion 
 
The point of these suggested reforms is to help prosecutors spot 
discovery issues and learn from their mistakes.  Improving culture and 
training to reduce discovery errors may ultimately be more productive 
than blaming prosecutors, except in egregious cases.  By hiring, 
training, and supervising better, prosecutors’ offices can learn to gather 
all the exculpatory and inculpatory evidence and, when in doubt, 
disclose.37  Painting a more complete picture of the evidence should 
help not only to free the innocent, but also to convict the guilty. 
 
 37 Of course, prosecutors cannot ignore exculpatory information, and they have an ethical 
obligation to pursue truth and justice.  As a rule, however, legally binding discovery obligations 
cover only information and materials within the custody or control of police, prosecutors, or other 
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IV.     SYSTEMS AND CULTURE: REPORTED BY RONALD F. WRIGHT38 
 
The Working Group on Systems and Culture addressed the 
systemic and cultural aspects of a prosecutor’s office that could best 
contribute to high compliance rates with the prosecutor’s legal and 
ethical obligations to disclose information to the defense.  Organizations 
develop their own cultures, and those cultures can influence the 
disclosure decisions of individual prosecutors.  The organizational 
culture interacts with the systems that the chief prosecutor establishes in 
the office to promote compliance with disclosure obligations. 
The topics addressed in this Working Group inevitably overlapped 
to some degree with the topics covered in other groups.  In an effort to 
minimize this double coverage, the group de-emphasized training—
particularly the training intended for relative newcomers to a 
prosecutor’s office—treating this as the principal topic for the Working 
Group on Training and Supervision.  The Systems and Culture group 
also avoided the topic of remedies for identified violations, leaving that 
territory for the Working Group on Internal Regulation.  By putting 
aside the training of newcomers and remedies for violations, the 
emphasis for the Working Group remained on regularized office 
practices and values that lead to the prevention and detection of 
disclosure violations. 
Two weeks before the start of the Symposium, the Working Group 
received an outline of issues from the group’s discussion leader.  The 
document included references to several books and articles from the 
relevant academic literature on each subtopic.  The outline noted several 
features of organizational culture that could affect compliance: 
 
agents of the state.  While it may be salutory and praiseworthy for police and prosecutors to 
investigate further and collect additional information favorable to defendants, the Constitution 
does not obligate them to do so. 
 38 Discussion Leader: Barbara O’Brien, Assistant Professor of Law, Michigan State 
University College of Law; Reporter: Ronald F. Wright, Professor of Law and Executive 
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Wake Forest University.  Other members of the Working 
Group on Systems and Culture included: Paul Connick, District Attorney, Jefferson Parish, 
Louisiana; Gerald J. Coyne, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Rhode Island Attorney 
General; Kristine Hamann, Executive Assistant District Attorney, Office of the Special Narcotics 
Prosecutor for the City of New York; Caroline Donhauser, Assistant District Attorney, Kings 
County, New York; Matthew Redle, County and Prosecuting Attorney for Sheridan County, 
Wyoming; Richard C. Goemann, Executive Director, D.C. Law Students in Court Program; Joel 
B. Rudin, The Law Offices of Joel B. Rudin; Lawton Posey Cummings, Visiting Associate 
Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School; Madeline deLone, Executive 
Director, The Innocence Project; Dr. Maria Hartwig, Assistant Professor, John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice, The City University of New York; Dr. Larry R. Richard, Organizational and 
Management Consultant, Hildebrandt (a management consulting firm to the legal market); and 
Dr. Gordon Schiff, Associate Professor of Medicine, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Harvard 
Medical School. 
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leadership,39 incentives,40 personnel decisions, and professionalization.  
It also introduced several office systems that could influence the 
disclosure practices of prosecutors: horizontal or vertical organization,41 
centralized or decentralized organization, election effects,42 a designated 
lead attorney for ethics within the office, written office guidelines 
regarding disclosure,43 and after-the-fact audits of attorney disclosure. 
 
A.     Culture of the Prosecutor’s Office 
 
Sociologists tend to view organizational culture as something more 
than a defined hierarchy that formally assigns bureaucratic 
responsibilities.  Organizations develop values. Members behave 
according to informal patterns of influence within the organization, 
which sometimes depart from the organization chart.44  The culture of 
an organization offers “a learned body of tradition that governs what 
one needs to know, think and feel in order to meet standards of 
membership.”45 
The Working Group began the day’s discussion by considering the 
relationship between culture and systems.  Does the chief prosecutor 
aim for straightforward compliance with office procedures related to 
disclosure, or does he or she depend on a deeper commitment to the 
principles that support disclosure?  Put another way, does the office rely 
on systems only, or does the lead prosecutor need to develop the culture 
of the office to promote proper disclosure? 
There was widespread consensus in the Working Group that 
prosecutors cannot rely on systems alone.  Culture needs to reinforce 
systems, and vice versa.  Rules have limited influence, particularly 
where the compliance infrastructure related to the rule is weak.  In these 
situations—which are inevitable in a world of limited resources—only a 
 
 39 The outline directed readers to Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus 
Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 996-1016 (2009). 
 40 See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion 
and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851 (1995). 
 41 See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009). 
 42 See Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581 
(2009). 
 43 See Richard H. Kuh, Plea Bargaining: Guidelines for the Manhattan District Attorney’s 
Office, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 48, 55 (1975); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as 
Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010 (2005). 
 44 See W. Richard Scott, Reflections on a Half-Century of Organizational Sociology, in  
THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF CONTEMPORARY THEORY AND 
RESEARCH 2 (Amy S. Wharton ed., 2007). 
 45 GIDEON KUNDA, ENGINEERING CULTURE: CONTROL AND COMMITMENT IN A HIGH-TECH 
CORPORATION 8 (1992). 
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deeper commitment to the values that support disclosure will 
accomplish the goal of full compliance. 
The value of a culture that reinforces the power of rules is easy to 
see when reflecting on a typical context for hard disclosure questions.  
Every prosecutor experiences moments when he or she believes that the 
defense attorney has failed to carry out the legal duties of disclosure.  If 
the prosecutor complies with the rules without any underlying 
commitment to a culture of compliance, he or she will be sorely tempted 
to cheat in this setting: “If the defense attorney cheats, why shouldn’t 
I?”  A prosecutor can look beyond this perception that others are failing 
to follow the rules if one believes in the intrinsic value of compliance. 
Some observed that prosecutors come from a broader American 
culture that celebrates individual success as an overarching value.  In 
the prosecutor’s office, the attorneys must depart from that habit of 
mind, and instead define success as the achievement of a social benefit, 
rather than pursuit of immediate self-interest.  This reformulation of the 
ideal of success means that an attorney sometimes must “fall on the 
sword” if that is what justice demands. 
 
1.     Leadership 
 
One of the chief sources of an office culture is leadership from the 
top of the organization.  As one participant put it, “a sports team adopts 
the personality of its coach, and something like that happens in the 
prosecutor’s office.” 
Leadership within a prosecutor’s office must convey to the rank 
and file that the goal of the prosecutor is the protection of the public, but 
adherence to ethical principles is the essential means of obtaining that 
goal.  Recall that most prosecutorial decisions about disclosure take 
place in gray areas that compel some judgment.  If prosecutors view the 
mission of the office as simply to protect public safety, they will be 
hostile to the disclosure of impeachment evidence that might confuse 
the jury’s view of a witness, a witness that the prosecutor views as 
truthful.  The chief prosecutor’s description of the objectives of the 
office—while they surely do include public safety—must include some 
endorsement of the adversary process and respect for the role of jurors 
in resolving disputes about credibility. Put another way, the chief 
prosecutor’s definition of success must go beyond the notion of a “win” 
in the adversarial trial setting. 
Prosecutors can define the organization’s concept of success 
through the telling of war stories; the Working Group reached broad 
consensus that the war stories chosen to tell and re-tell in an office must 
include examples of litigation fairness along with trial victories.  The 
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defense attorneys in the group noted that the leader in a Public 
Defender’s office—given the small number of acquittals—already must 
find stories that celebrate something other than wins at trial.  Where 
defense attorney leaders might praise extra effort, diligence in 
investigation, or creativity in developing legal challenges, a prosecutor 
might honor an attorney who discloses relevant information as duty 
requires, despite the risk of a loss at trial. 
Chief prosecutors who consider ways to facilitate offenders’ re-
entry to society send a broader message that they take their non-
adversarial roles seriously. The elected prosecutor can celebrate cases 
resulting in diversion and treatment, which successfully rehabilitates an 
offender. 
The Working Group also agreed that a case overturned on appeal 
cannot provide the only definition of failure in the disclosure context.  
Disclosure “failures” happen even where the conviction is saved.  The 
group found merit in the concept of the “near miss” from the medical 
context, instances where a health care practitioner makes an error that 
luckily does not result in a bad outcome for a patient.  Risk managers in 
the health care context treat these “near misses” as important diagnostic 
tools to improve systems.  Prosecutors might use in this same manner 
any cases affirmed on appeal after a finding of no materiality or no 
prejudice. 
One of the most intriguing and important leadership tasks that the 
Working Group identified is this: The chief prosecutor must develop 
among the attorneys and support staff a shared sense of responsibility 
for cases.  Group members agreed that line prosecutors stumble into 
disclosure violations too often when they hold the mindset that a 
prosecution is “my case.”  Chief prosecutors and the office supervisors 
need to break that mindset and stress to line prosecutors that the entire 
office shares responsibility for the cases. 
Another leadership issue relates to the standard that attorneys in 
the office use for judging Brady issues.  At least one prosecutor in the 
Working Group instructs all the attorneys in his office to focus on 
“favorability” questions, while ignoring the issue of “materiality.”  
Under this standard, line prosecutors know that if the evidence is 
favorable to the defense, they must disclose it and leave for later judicial 
rulings any questions of relevance or admissibility at trial.  As a result, 
the prosecutors err on the side of disclosure in all close cases.  The 
Working Group as a whole reached no consensus about whether this 
policy was feasible or desirable in other prosecutors’ offices. 
The members of the Working Group disagreed on the capacity of 
chief prosecutors to announce coherent and consistent objects for their 
offices.  The prosecutors in the group noted that classic statements by 
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Justice Sutherland46 are widely admired among prosecutors.  These 
statements could form the basis for a shared set of objectives among 
different prosecutors’ offices.  The defense attorneys and other 
observers were less convinced that prosecutors could articulate a set of 
objectives for the attorneys in their office that would amount to more 
than boilerplate or truisms about criminal prosecutions. 
 
2.     Election Effects on Leadership 
 
Given that local voters elect the overwhelming majority of chief 
prosecutors in the United States, the Working Group considered the 
effect of electoral politics on the leadership of chief prosecutors.  The 
requirements of political campaigns could have good or bad effects on 
office leadership.  On the positive side, political sensitivity of an elected 
prosecutor could promote a long-term perspective on office credibility, 
recognizing the practical value of a public reputation for fairness.  
Direct political accountability to local voters can also promote even-
handed justice and make prosecutors more willing to pursue charges 
against other elected officials.  New York observers in the Working 
Group noted that in New Jersey, the state prosecutors rarely file 
corruption charges, perhaps because they are appointed through the 
statewide political structure.  In New York, by contrast, the elected 
District Attorneys with their own local political bases seem more 
willing to bring corruption cases against state officials. 
On the negative side of the ledger, elected prosecutors are highly 
aware of the likely reactions of voters, and might expect line 
prosecutors to cut corners to increase short-term success.  One of the 
academic observers in the group proposed an election law policy that 
would prevent candidates from discussing conviction rates during re-
election campaigns for incumbents.  The prosecutors in the group were 
quick to dismiss this proposal as unrealistic and undesirable because 
important and revealing conversations grow out of these numbers, 
giving voters a legitimate basis for evaluating the incumbent. 
The elected prosecutors in the group described the choice they 
must make between a short-term and long-term perspective.  In an 
immediate sense, there might be some electoral benefits if the office 
wins important cases, and aggressive nondisclosure might help the 
office win some of those cases.  But in the long run, there are serious 
reputational costs if attorneys in the office cut corners.  Particularly if a 
 
 46 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“[A prosecutor] may strike hard 
blows, [but] is not at liberty to strike foul ones.  It is as much [the prosecutor’s] duty to refrain 
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every 
legitimate means to bring about a just one.”). 
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case is overturned on review, the elected prosecutor must explain the 
error to the victims and their families, and ultimately to the public.  
Once the office gets a reputation for breaking the rules, the prosecutors 
will become less effective in front of juries and community groups.  The 
prosecutors pointed to Mike Nifong in North Carolina and to former 
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales as examples of prosecutors who 
made poor prosecutorial decisions based on political considerations. 
One prosecutor offered this summary about the irony of electoral 
politics in the work of prosecution: “If you consider politics in doing the 
job, you will be a one-termer.” 
For these reasons, the elected prosecutors in the Working Group 
endorsed the long-term perspective.  During the campaign, an 
incumbent needs to discuss more than conviction rates and successes in 
prominent recent cases; the incumbent also needs to inform voters about 
litigation fairness, diversion programs, drug testing, outreach in schools, 
and the whole range of office programs that promote public safety.  This 
strategy reduces the tension between electoral politics and compliance 
with disclosure obligations. 
 
3.     Personnel Practices 
 
The attorneys that a prosecutor’s office hires provide the “raw 
material” that is shaped by culture and systems in the office.  If new 
attorneys are attentive to their disclosure obligations, the measures 
taken in the office to promote proper disclosure are more likely to be 
effective. 
It is clear that District Attorneys’ offices do not rely on law school 
instruction to inform new prosecutors about their ethical and legal 
obligations of disclosure.  The prosecutors in the Working Group all 
adopted a working assumption that new law school graduates were 
“tabula rasa.” 
The entire group expressed enthusiasm for a practice of the District 
Attorney in Dallas, Texas, described during the first day of the 
Symposium.47  Each interviewee for a job as a prosecutor receives a 
copy of Brady and is asked to read the case in preparation for the 
interview.  The interviewers discuss the case with each applicant. 
The Working Group did not linger on the topic of training 
programs for newly-hired attorneys, in an effort to avoid duplicating the 
work of the Working Group on Training and Supervision.  
Nevertheless, the conversation did touch on this topic. One observer 
suggested a simple, short course on disclosure that could be created 
 
 47 Voices from the Field, supra note 28, at 2069 (presentation by Terri Moore). 
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through collaboration among different professional associations, from 
both the prosecution and defense sides.  Such a standardized training 
session might be built around some hard Brady cases.  The Working 
Group generally endorsed the idea that disclosure obligations should be 
integrated into training on other topics.  By avoiding a separate label of 
“ethics training,” the leadership can promote the habit of keeping ethical 
responsibilities at the forefront in all of a lawyer’s activities. 
The academic observers noted that we know too little about the 
professionalization of attorneys.  We do not yet understand the relative 
importance of various groups in forming the professional identity and 
habits of prosecutors and other attorneys.  Those influences might come 
from legal education; professional associations at the international, 
national, state, and local levels; formally-appointed leaders within an 
office; or more informal leaders or peer groups.  A substantial body of 
sociological research examines the professionalization of fields such as 
medicine. Relatively little such research exists as to the legal profession. 
 
4.     Culture Embodied in Incentives 
 
Line prosecutors understand that some actions in their offices lead 
to advancement and rewards, while others lead to disadvantage. The 
realities of such incentive systems, in the long run, will matter more 
than any verbal affirmations of values in the organization.  Incentives 
embody the organizational culture. Incentive systems that punish proper 
disclosure by a prosecutor, whether through formal or informal 
consequences, will overwhelm any verbal affirmations about the 
importance of fair play. 
The Working Group first considered financial incentives—
payments made to attorneys who fulfill their disclosure obligations.  In 
general, the group was unenthusiastic about financial incentives.  For 
one thing, budgets are already tight and prosecutors would find it 
difficult to divert money from other office functions to offer such 
incentives.  In addition, many in the group found it objectionable to 
“reward people for doing their jobs.” 
The Working Group also remained skeptical about financial 
rewards because of the issues raised in the presentation by Barry 
Schwartz on the first day of the Symposium.48  The participants were 
concerned that placing a monetary value on compliance would reframe 
this conduct as something other than an ethical duty, meaning that the 
“extra” reason to comply (money) would undermine the original reason 
and actually make it less likely that prosecutors would behave properly. 
 
 48 Id. at 2083 (presentation by Barry Schwartz). 
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Instead of financial rewards, the Working Group discussed non-
financial incentives to comply with disclosure obligations.  The group 
tried to identify rewards that reinforce the ethical component of 
disclosure rules. While acknowledging the intrinsic value of 
compliance, incentives might appear intermittently to reinforce good 
conduct.  The incentives might not be promised ahead of time, but 
would add some benefits on occasion for those who performed well. 
The incentives might take the form of support of the line 
prosecutor in the midst of institutional conflicts.  For instance, 
prosecutors noted that it is costly in relationship terms for an assistant 
district attorney (ADA) to pursue an integrity question originating in the 
police department.  Leaders in the prosecutor’s office must incentivize 
this behavior by signaling that they will support the line prosecutors if 
the police object to the inquiry.  A supervisor can encourage further 
inquiry with other officers, or can arrange meetings with higher-level 
officials at the police department if an ADA uncovers a systemic non-
compliance problem among police officers. 
The Working Group acknowledged that heavy caseloads, 
especially for the least experienced attorneys, create poor incentives for 
prosecutors when it comes to the most difficult or subtle disclosure 
questions.  A burdensome caseload sometimes prevents thoughtful 
processing of cases.  As one defense attorney phrased it, “the caseload 
becomes the practical training,” and sets a pattern for the prosecutor’s 
entire career.  One of the academic observers asked about the prospects 
of assigning lighter caseloads to the newest ADAs, at least during their 
first few months on the job.  The practicing attorneys in the Working 
Group all found this suggestion to be highly impractical. 
The participants discussed their widely varied views about the 
incentives currently operating in prosecutors’ offices.  The prosecutors 
in the group believed that the non-financial incentives largely support 
high-quality ethical compliance with discovery obligations.  By and 
large, they believe that attorneys in their offices are rewarded for doing 
good work, and “good work” includes the obligation to comply with all 
legal and ethical obligations, including disclosure of evidence.  The 
prosecutors noted that the people who are attracted to criminal 
prosecution as a profession tend to treat virtue as its own reward. 
On the other hand, the defense attorneys and some of the non-
practitioner observers offered a very different account.  They pointed to 
particular cases or practices that conflicted, in their view, with this 
positive account of the incentives at work.  They suggested that a 
narrower vision of success—one based on convictions above all—is the 
norm for prosecutors’ offices. 
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B.     Structure of the Prosecutor’s Office 
 
The latter half of the day’s discussion was devoted to particular 
structures within a prosecutor’s office that support a positive culture.  
These structures might have the explicit goal of promoting disclosure 
compliance; more frequently, however, the practices and institutions 
described here serve some other principal purpose, and compliance with 
disclosure obligations amounts to a side benefit. 
 
1.     Horizontal Versus Vertical Organization 
 
Chief prosecutors typically face a basic choice in organizing their 
offices.  A horizontal organization assigns the attorneys to units that 
perform certain specialized functions in a case.  For instance, the 
Screening Unit might handle early decisions for a file, then hand it to 
the Trial Unit, where the attorneys obtain a resolution in the case, before 
passing it along to the Appeals Unit.  A vertical organization, on the 
other hand, assigns a single attorney (or the same group of attorneys) to 
handle the case from start to finish.  In reality, most prosecutors’ offices 
combine aspects of vertical and horizontal organization. 
In theory, the Working Group acknowledged that a horizontal 
organization might be more conducive to ethical disclosure practices.  
For one thing, a horizontal organization might reinforce the concept of 
joint ownership of cases.  It also allows more attorneys to review the 
file and the evidence, decreasing the risk that evidence to disclose will 
go unnoticed through negligence. 
On the whole, however, the Working Group concluded that this 
structural choice has little practical impact on disclosure practices in an 
office.  Either horizontal or vertical organization could support high-
quality disclosure practices. 
Whether the office is organized in a horizontal or vertical manner, 
it is important to structure the office in ways that make attorneys 
interdependent to some degree.  This might be accomplished through a 
somewhat centralized organization, assigning supervisors who remain 
informed about the work of line prosecutors.  An office that is 
accountable in specific ways to report to statewide agencies (perhaps in 
the state Attorney General’s office) is more likely to create this culture 
of accountability, although statewide control is not necessary.  One 
prosecutor, however, noted a conundrum: Supervisors in a prosecutor’s 
office normally make strong reputations by “protecting their people,” 
and handling problems within their own units.  The office leadership 
needs to find a way around this common norm in order to encourage 
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supervisors to pass along information about improper disclosure 
practices by an attorney in the unit. 
One of the participants drew a parallel to the medical arena: 
Doctors tend to know when one of their colleagues is prone to mistakes, 
and they take corrective actions of various sorts.  Similarly, a well-
structured prosecutor’s office should make it possible for other 
attorneys to notice when one of their peers (or underlings) is prone to 
mistakes.  The prosecutors indicated that feedback about mistake-prone 
prosecutors could arrive from judges or police officers, or even from 
victims who ask to meet with the chief prosecutor.  Not all of these 
groups have access to information about disclosure errors, but 
prosecutor errors of various types might correlate with disclosure 
violations. 
 
2.     Designated Expert 
 
Many large private law firms in the United States have begun to 
appoint one of their own attorneys as Legal Counsel for the firm, 
responding to questions from the firm’s attorneys about ethics and 
resolving other legal questions that face the law firm as a business 
enterprise.  The firm’s counsel also identifies sources of risk for the 
organization, such as gender bias or misconduct in the sale of firm 
information.  Could a similar model—designating a “disclosure expert” 
or “ethics expert” within the prosecutor’s office—identify and reduce 
sources of risk in the criminal adjudication context? 
The disclosure expert would encourage line prosecutors to consult 
others whenever problem cases arise.  To accomplish this, the 
disclosure expert must offer more than just a few training sessions for 
new prosecutors.  The training must happen on a regular schedule.  The 
training should include law clerks and investigators, along with anyone 
else who interacts with the police department.  During the intervals 
between the scheduled training sessions, the disclosure expert might 
issue “alerts” to describe new court rulings or other important 
developments in the field.  At least one of the prosecutors in the 
Working Group already employs a version of this model.  The lead 
prosecutor appoints a “Brady officer,” who issues periodic “Brady 
alerts” to all the attorneys in the office and asks them to sign a statement 
acknowledging that they have read each alert. 
The disclosure expert would not only disseminate information to 
the office, but he or she would also collect information from the 
attorneys about any appeals or other claims of failure to follow 
disclosure rules.  In this way, the disclosure expert aggregates in one 
place all the available information about office practices.  On the basis 
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of this office-wide view, the prosecutor who handles this portfolio can 
spend some time thinking about risk management.  The most dangerous 
choices are those that happen without thinking, in the middle of battle.  
A designated expert can approach these questions from a dispassionate 
vantage point. 
The disclosure expert can also counter the “habituation” 
phenomenon, in which members of an organization lose their ability to 
think of an event as a preventable problem after they become habituated 
to such events.  An office ethics counsel can shake up the routine and 
freshen the thinking about disclosure problems.  The non-practitioner 
observers in the Working Group commented that firms in the financial 
industry train their employees how to protect confidential client 
information.  They might be able to propose better routines about 
disclosure. 
Who should the lead prosecutor designate as the disclosure expert?  
The Working Group reached a clear consensus that this person should 
not carry the authority to discipline office employees for violation of 
disclosure rules.  The expert should remain more a “confidante” than a 
“hatchet person.”  Several noted that the U.S. Department of Justice 
uses a similar arrangement, separating the function of advice and 
training on ethics issues from the function of those who discipline 
attorneys for ethical lapses.49 
The Working Group also agreed that the designated expert should 
be someone with experience in the office, and someone who has earned 
broad respect among the attorneys.  In all but the largest and most 
specialized prosecutors’ offices, the designated expert would carry other 
duties.  It could be effective to assign this function to someone in the 
appeals unit of the office.  Such an attorney could monitor appeals 
related to disclosure violations, and identify the “teachable moments” 
that arise from the appeals. 
 
3.     Written Guidelines 
 
The Working Group explored the viability of written guidelines to 
shape the disclosure decisions of line prosecutors.  Many offices already 
generate written guidelines to deal with certain charging and disposition 
questions, such as the acceptable plea bargaining outcomes for 
 
 49 For a description of the Office of Professional Responsibility, which investigates 
allegations of misconduct involving Department of Justice Attorneys, see United States 
Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, http://www.justice.gov/opr/ (last 
visited June 9, 2010).  The Professional Responsibility Advisory Office is a separate entity within 
the Department.  United States Department of Justice, About PRAO, http://www.justice.gov/prao/ 
(last visited June 9, 2010). 
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categories of cases.  Some guidelines designate the acceptable range of 
substantive outcomes, while others specify a process to follow before 
taking certain actions (such as a requirement that a line attorney consult 
with a supervisor before dismissing certain types of charges).  The 
group addressed the question of whether similar written guidelines 
might be helpful in the context of disclosure practices. 
Rachel Barkow’s comments from the first day of the Symposium50 
drew an analogy between prosecutor compliance programs and 
corporate compliance programs written in response to the federal 
sentencing guidelines.51  Part of the value of such compliance programs 
is the deliberate thinking and diagnosis that occurs during the drafting 
of such guidelines. 
Initially, the practicing attorneys in the group expressed concern 
about the ability of written rules to account for subtle case-specific 
facts.  As the conversation progressed, however, the prosecutors in the 
group came to the view that they already issue several relevant forms of 
written guidance.  For instance, some offices produce “investigation 
manuals,” consisting of checklists and other guidance in the preparation 
of investigation files for trial.52 
The group decided that written guidance might prove most useful 
in obtaining the relevant disclosure information from police 
investigators.  This is especially true regarding impeachment evidence.  
Several of the prosecutors in the group noted that they already use 
standard letters to request information from police personnel files that 
could contain impeachment evidence related to officers who might 
testify at trial. 
The next step in the use of checklists to prepare for trial might be 
to collect checklists from different offices, and to develop knowledge 
and practices that are transferable to other jurisdictions.  It would also 
be useful to employ information technology that allows different users 
to enter in one location all the actions taken to complete the relevant 
checklist in preparing a case for resolution.  Remarkably, such a 
 
 50 Rachel Barkow, Professor, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law, New York 
University School of Law, Presentation at the Cardozo Law Review Symposium: New 
Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What Really Works? (Nov. 15, 2009) 
(transcript on file with the Cardozo Law Review); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational 
Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089 (2010). 
 51 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2009). 
 52 The use of discovery checklists garnered considerable support from several of the other 
Working Groups.  See supra Part II.A.2 to A.3 (Working Group on the Disclosure Process) 
(reaching consensus on prosecutors’ use of checklists and agreeing on the advantages of police 
officers’ use of investigative checklists); infra Part V.A.3 (Working Group on Internal 
Regulation) (supporting the use of discovery checklists as a regulatory device); infra Part VI.B.7 
(Working Group on External Regulation) (supporting “unanimously . . . the idea of checklists” 
for prosecutors to detail what is being disclosed and “a privilege log that lists what is withheld”). 
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straightforward data system is not available in most prosecutors’ 
offices. 
 
4.     Audits 
 
The Working Group spent considerable time in the afternoon 
session talking about “audits” as a pro-active method to identify 
problems with disclosure.  The group drew a parallel to the “morbidity 
review panels” in health care, that is, efforts to diagnose areas for 
improved treatment based on a review of poor outcomes.  An internal 
review team or an external group of evaluators might conduct the audits 
in a prosecutor’s office.  These audits might take place after the 
complete resolution of the case, or an “interim” audit might evaluate the 
work of the line prosecutor at various stages in the processing of a case. 
Early in the discussion, the prosecutors in the group were quite 
skeptical of the value or viability of audits.  Some pointed out that 
defense attorneys already serve as effective auditors of the disclosure 
practices in their offices, through the appeals and post-conviction relief 
claims that they file.  Others pointed out that every attorney in the office 
is already swamped with active files, leaving no extra time to respond to 
the questions of any external auditors or to conduct any internal audits. 
The non-practitioners in the group pointed out that audits could 
take place even in the presence of tight resources.  The available time 
and budget might limit the audits to an extremely small random sample 
of cases, but some sample could receive a post hoc review even on a 
very limited budget. 
The difficulty with appeals as a device for identifying disclosure 
problems is that they do not represent a random sample of all the cases 
that a prosecutor’s office processes.  There may be types of violations 
that rarely or never result in appeals.  Recall that a defense attorney 
would need to have some inkling of the evidence not disclosed before 
filing such a claim.  Only a few defendants make Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) requests, which is one method to obtain 
documents they did not receive before trial.  The FOIA officer 
apparently follows different disclosure practices than the trial attorney, 
raising hopes that auditors might also take a different view of the case 
than the trial attorney. 
The prosecutors in the group noted that certain forms of “interim” 
audits already occur for at least some cases.  In some offices, “trial 
preparation conferences” require the trial attorney (and possibly the lead 
investigating officer from the police department) to present to a 
leadership group all the available proof and the status of trial readiness, 
including any disclosures made to the defense.  Similarly, Brady issues 
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sometimes are anticipated in a “charging conference” that reviews the 
evidence before the filing of charges in certain serious cases. Once 
again, however, this subset of cases is not a random sample of all the 
cases handled in a prosecutor’s office. 
At least one prosecutor in the group has already instituted a 
randomized interim audit system.  On an unannounced basis, an ADA is 
asked to bring all of his or her files to the section chief, and to walk 
through each of them to explain past actions and future plans. 
Disclosure of evidence is one topic that the section chief and the trial 
attorney discuss during this spot check. 
Over time, the discussion uncovered some features of internal 
audits that might appeal to some prosecutors.  For instance, an office 
with an active auditing practice would compel prosecutors to record all 
of their discovery actions in the case file.  The discipline of building a 
record, following automatic rules about information to be recorded in 
the file, could serve as a memory jog for the attorney.  It is not the post 
hoc inspection that creates quality; rather, it is the engineering of the 
case in anticipation of the later inspection. 
The prosecutors also concluded that a case audit would prove more 
attractive in their offices if the scope of the review went beyond 
disclosure issues.  The auditor might ask if the attorney properly 
protected witnesses and communicated well with the victim. Some 
prosecutors believed that the auditors would routinely encounter a “big 
mess” in some files, and would treat any disclosure problems as a 
secondary concern when compared to the overall organizational deficits 
of the trial attorney. 
Another form of internal interim audit occurs when the office 
leadership reassigns attorneys to cases on a periodic basis.  For instance, 
some offices assign particular line prosecutors to a given courtroom, 
and then reassign all the attorneys to new courtrooms on a regular basis 
to prevent the distorting effects of familiar relationships with judges and 
defense counsel.  After the reassignment, each attorney gets a detailed 
view of many files and may assess the actions of his or her predecessor 
in prosecuting the cases. 
Turning from interim audits to post-adjudication reviews that are 
completed after the resolution of a case, the most easily-achieved audit 
would be a “file only” audit.  The auditing attorney would review the 
file to identify any evidence that should have been disclosed, and then 
look for evidence in the file that the evidence was in fact disclosed to 
the defense.  A more meaningful—but far more expensive and 
intrusive—review would be a “file plus” audit.  This form of audit 
would require the reviewing attorney to go beyond the available file 
documents in the prosecutor’s office.  The reviewer would obtain the 
police department’s investigative file, interview the investigating 
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officers and the key witnesses in an attempt to identify the full range of 
required disclosure. The Working Group reached a consensus view that 
such a thoroughgoing audit would not be administratively or politically 
sustainable.  Nevertheless, the partial “file-only” audit would uncover a 
meaningful set of problems. 
The prosecutor captures the real value of audits only by monitoring 
the patterns of potential shortcomings from case to case.  The auditing 
structure needs to be concentrated in a few individuals, or the auditors 
must record their findings in a database available to others.  Whatever 
form it takes, some method must be present to allow the leadership to 
see repeated problems in the process, or to flag individual police 
officers or line prosecutors who are involved with an unusually high 
number of problem cases. 
The group spent only a brief time discussing external audits.  
Several prosecutors noted that teams from the NDAA and the National 
Association of Attorneys General already perform management review 
audits for a few local prosecutors upon request.  There is some question 
as to how deep an external review team can get into the operation of the 
office in a short time, but the teams already do case-level reviews, and 
talk to all employees if possible.  At least one prosecutor in the group 
reported poor experiences with such external auditors.  They took too 
long, and missed the larger picture while becoming too focused on “the 
weeds.”  Others in the group were more sanguine about the prospects 
for an external audit that might take the shape of the accreditation 
reviews that the American Bar Association performs in law schools 
every seven years.  The NDAA standards might serve as a basis for 
evaluating the office, or the auditors might look to the ABA standards 
for prosecutors.53 
There are precedents for external audits of similar institutions.  
One prosecutor noted that audits are currently a routine part of 
certifications for crime laboratories.  Law enforcement agencies, jails, 
and prisons can also volunteer to submit to audits in an effort to achieve 
certifications of certain levels of professional competence and quality.  
Others drew analogies to the external audits of hospitals.  While such 
audits of a prosecutor’s office would almost surely remain voluntary, an 
elected prosecutor might have political incentives to obtain some form 
of external approval and credibility.  A newly-elected prosecutor might 
find an external audit at the beginning of the term office useful, to 
establish a baseline for measuring progress over the first few years in 
office.  Just as sheriffs and prison administrators convince the funding 
authorities to pay for these external audits, prosecutors might be able to 
accomplish the same. 
 
 53 See NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS (Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n, 3d ed. 2009); 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEF. FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993). 
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The Working Group closed with a discussion of public access to 
the results of any audit.  The group did not reach agreement on this 
question.  Some expressed concern that conclusions about general office 
practices or evaluations of actions in particular cases could fall into the 
hands of defense attorneys.  These participants believed that the audits 
would prove attractive and useful to prosecutors only if they received 
explicit protection from state open records laws or other forms of 
disclosure.  Others, however, believed that a prosecutor might want to 
publish the results of any audit as a demonstration of transparency and a 
method to promote public confidence in the quality of the work taking 
place in the office. 
 
C.     Conclusion 
 
The systems and culture that the Working Group discussed all 
began with an active role for the leadership in the prosecutor’s office.  
All the participants envisioned an office that promoted active discussion 
of office objectives and lawyering decisions.  Ideally, an office treats 
compliance with the legal and ethical obligations of disclosure as an 
articulated and jointly-held responsibility. It is not left to the 
unmonitored and unspoken judgment of individual prosecuting 
attorneys.  Compliance grows out of coordination. 
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V.      INTERNAL REGULATION: REPORTED BY JENNIFER E. LAURIN54 
 
The Working Group on Internal Regulation55 addressed the 
question of what role guidelines and processes that are developed and 
carried out within individual prosecutors’ offices can and should play in 
governing evidentiary disclosure. A variety of internal controls can 
serve to regulate behavior within prosecutors’ offices, including 
supervision, training, written policies, cultural norms, and disciplinary 
processes.  All of these techniques and factors have a role to play in, 
and must be considered in assessing, internal regulation.  Only some, 
however, were considered to be within the scope of the work of the 
Working Group—both because not all were core to the notion of 
internal regulation, and because some topics were taken up by other 
working groups.  Thus, for example, exploration of supervision and 
training was left to the Working Group on Training and Supervision.56  
And, while organizational culture clearly has a bearing upon internal 
regulation, that topic was left for development by the Working Group 
on Systems and Culture.57  Furthermore, while the precise contours of a 
prosecutor’s disclosure obligations are obviously fundamental to the 
question of what internal regulation aims to achieve, discussion of the 
substance of those obligations was left to the Working Group on 
Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations and Practices.58  The Internal 
Regulation Working Group proceeded on an assumption that the goal of 
 
 54 Discussion Leader: Daniel S. Medwed, Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law at 
The University of Utah; Reporter: Jennifer E. Laurin, Assistant Professor, University of Texas 
School of Law.  Other members of the Working Group on Internal Regulation included: Dr. 
Karen L. Amendola, The Police Foundation; Dr. Rohit Bhalla, Montefiore Medical Center and 
Assistant Professor, Albert Einstein College of Medicine of Yeshiva University; Rhonda 
Ferdinand, Deputy Chief Assistant District Attorney, Office of the Special Narcotics Prosecutor 
for the City of New York; Christopher Hill, Assistant District Attorney, New York County, New 
York; Morrie Kleinbart, Assistant District Attorney, Richmond County, New York; John M. 
McEnany, Associate United States Attorney, Southern District of New York; Wayne McKenzie, 
Vera Institute of Justice; Lohra L. Miller, District Attorney, Salt Lake City, Utah; Shana-Tara 
Regon, Director of White Collar Crime Policy, National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers; Jenny M. Roberts, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, 
American University; Rebecca Roiphe, Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School; 
Anne Swern, First Assistant District Attorney, Kings County, New York; and Hon. James Yates, 
Justice, Supreme Court, New York County, New York.  Institutional affiliations are provided for 
identification purposes only.  All group members have had an opportunity to review this Part of 
the Article.  The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the opinions of any particular 
participant or any entity with which he or she is associated. 
 55 For discussion purposes, the Working Group treated the term “internal regulation” as 
encompassing compliance-generating oversight as a general matter, and did not presume it to 
connote any particular point on a spectrum ranging from highly specific, rule-type 
commandments to more flexible guidelines for conduct. 
 56 See supra Part III. 
 57 See supra Part IV. 
 58 See supra Part I. 
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internal regulation of discovery practices would be to ensure 
compliance with some legal and ethical disclosure norms. 
With those parameters set, two broad areas of internal regulation 
were explored by the Working Group: (1) the development of written 
guidelines for the substance and process of disclosure; and (2) auditing 
and oversight.  Exploration of each of these topics drew primarily upon 
the experiences of group members in the criminal justice field, but also 
substantially upon lessons from organizational management in other 
professions.  In particular, insights from recent quality control and 
oversight innovations in the field of medicine and hospital management, 
some of which were presented at the first day of the Symposium 
proceedings,59 informed several aspects of the group’s discussion.  
While analogies between the medical and criminal justice arenas should 
not be hastily drawn,60 some parallels do seem apt.  As this Part 
discusses, a number of internal regulatory practices that have developed 
in medicine did garner substantial support, and in some instances 
emerged as a consensus recommendation. 
A final introductory observation concerns the scope of 
recommendations presented from the Working Group, and the intended 
beneficial value of this Part.  In each of the two overarching areas of 
discussion, general agreement emerged as to the following 
recommended practices: 
(1) Written guidelines addressing both the substance of 
prosecutors’ evidentiary disclosure obligations, and the 
procedures by which those obligations should be effectuated, 
should be promulgated within prosecutors’ offices. 
(2) Prosecutors’ offices would benefit from the development and 
use of “checklists” that enumerate the categories or items of 
evidence to be disclosed in the course of a criminal case, as 
well as other tasks associated with the discovery process. 
(3) Prosecutors’ offices should adopt prospective auditing 
mechanisms that provide a mechanism of routine oversight of 
disclosure obligations, and generate data that can be used to 
improve development of and compliance with those 
guidelines. 
Although articulation of these areas of agreement is an important 
contribution of the group’s work, it must nevertheless be emphasized 
that the group reached a true consensus on relatively few matters.  
Moreover, as the listed recommendations illustrate and as the discussion 
that follows will elaborate, consensus could be articulated only at high 
 
 59 Voices from the Field, supra note 28, at 2038. 
 60 See infra Parts V.A.3, V.B. 
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levels of generality.  There are good and important reasons for this.  
First, time limitations significantly constrained the work of the group.  
Second, even within the group, the diversity among represented 
jurisdictions and prosecutors’ offices was substantial—from the 
standpoint of size and budget (contrast, for example, the Department of 
Justice and the City of Salt Lake), as well as organizational mission 
(contrast the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office with the Office of the 
Special Narcotics Prosecutor of the City of New York).  This is only a 
tiny microcosm of the diversity that exists when the United States 
criminal justice system as a whole is considered.  Hence, group 
members were understandably and appropriately sensitive to the fact 
that there were very few one-size-fits-all approaches that could be 
developed for implementation across the range of prosecutors’ offices 
that exist in the country.61 
Accordingly, this Report enumerates and describes the broad 
recommendations as to which consensus was reached, but also describes 
the group’s range of opinions concerning the details of implementing 
those recommendations, as well as splits of opinion that prevented 
consensus from being reached in other areas upon which discussion 
touched.  The hope is that the work of the group might offer not simply, 
or even primarily, recommended practices in these areas, but also a rich 
foundation upon which greater and perhaps more context-specific 
exploration of best practices in these areas might rest. 
 
A.     Written Guidelines Concerning Discovery 
 
Prosecutors’ offices should promulgate internal written guidelines 
that govern prosecutors’ disclosure obligations.  Such guidelines should 
be addressed not only to the content of discovery obligations, but also to 
process, and should describe and affirmatively direct such steps as 
consultation with supervising prosecutors and coordination with law 
enforcement to obtain evidence and information that may be subject to 
disclosure.  Prosecutors’ offices would benefit from the development of 
disclosure checklists enumerating disclosure tasks and requiring 




 61 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Publ’n No. NCJ 213799, 
PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 1-3 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf (summarizing diverse attributes of more than 2300 state prosecutors’ 
offices across the country). 
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The evidentiary disclosure obligations of American prosecutors are 
rooted in a number of sources: Brady v. Maryland62 derives from the 
United States Constitution and takes shape through decades of Supreme 
Court and lower court opinions; individual jurisdictions have judicially 
created or statutorily enacted discovery requirements; and ethical rules 
and standards developed by states, the NDAA, the ABA, and state or 
local bar associations also guide practice.  Notwithstanding the 
existence of external guidance to prosecutors, offices should develop 
internal, written guidelines to govern discovery practices.  Written 
guidelines serve two important goals.  First, they provide clear and 
distilled direction to prosecutors—particularly those who are early in 
their careers—who would otherwise be left to sort through the vast 
universe of externally developed rules and standards.  Second, written 
guidelines communicate a message through the office that good 
discovery practices are mandated from the top of the chain of command, 
and are part of the fabric of both the rules and culture of the office. 
A variety of approaches might guide the formulation of written 
discovery guidelines; as detailed below, no single approach emerged as 
a consensus recommendation from the group.  One overarching 
principle was, however, reflected in the views and considerations of all 
group participants: Incidents of nondisclosure by prosecutors are 
overwhelmingly attributable to mistakes regarding the contours of 
discovery obligations, or negligence in execution of those obligations, 
rather than bad faith or intentional wrongdoing. Disclosure guidelines 
must therefore be focused on eliminating unintentional errors—whether 
born from ignorance, time pressures, misjudgment, or laziness—as 
much if not more than eliminating misconduct. 
 
1.     Hard Versus Soft Guidelines 
 
As a general matter, written guidelines concerning discovery 
practices could take many forms.  One point of conceptual contrast is 
between hard and soft guidelines, i.e., between specific, constraining 
directives and more general or hortatory statements of goals.  In the 
discovery context, the former category of “hard” guidelines would 
include rules describing specific items of evidence to be disclosed and, 
perhaps, the time and manner in which disclosure should be effectuated.  
For example, an office might promulgate a written open file policy 
requiring all prosecutors to include certain specified categories of 
documents within their case files, and to provide defense counsel with 
access to that file upon request any time following arraignment.  Or, an 
 
 62 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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office policy could enumerate specific categories of evidence or 
documents that are required to be disclosed to defense counsel.  The 
latter category of “soft” guidelines would include written principles 
without accompanying mandates for how those principles should be 
applied in a given situation.  For example, an office might promulgate a 
written policy stating, “All prosecutors must promptly disclose to 
defense counsel all evidence or information that reasonably tends to 
undermine guilt or severity of punishment, or that tends to discredit a 
witness called by the prosecution at trial.” 
No single conception of the optimal “hardness” or “softness” of 
guidelines garnered unanimous support within the group.  As discussed 
below, a hybrid approach eventually emerged to garner majority, though 
not unanimous, support within the group.  Before detailing that 
approach, however, the considerations and concerns cited by group 
members in relation to the development of guidelines are described. 
A majority of group members favored a regime of soft guidelines.  
Proponents of that view expressed three primary concerns about the 
consequences of hard disclosure rules.  First, hard rules may be 
inherently incomplete.  Even within a single prosecutors’ office, 
describing with precision the evidence or information that must be 
turned over in any and every given criminal case is an impossible task.  
Different types of cases have distinctive evidentiary components—
consider, in DWI versus narcotics versus sexual assault cases, the range 
of scientific evidence alone—and any given office might deal with a 
range of law enforcement agencies, each having their own forms.  The 
generality and flexibility afforded by soft rules, by contrast, afford 
greater adaptability to changing institutional environments, and may 
therefore, perhaps counter-intuitively, afford better guidance than a 
closely tailored but hole-ridden hard regime.  Second, hard rules 
preclude the exercise of prosecutorial discretion that, in the minds of 
many group members, is at the heart of any lawyer’s craft; converting 
discovery into a wholly robotic practice devoid of judgment creates bad 
habits of mind.  This effect is particularly problematic, advocates of 
softer rules say, given one of the inevitable deficiencies of hard rules, 
their inherent incompleteness.  A prosecutor trained not to make case-
by-case judgments about the propriety of disclosure will be more apt not 
to disclose evidence or information that should be provided to the 
defense but that is not specifically enumerated within the guidelines 
upon which she is rendered dependent.  The same holds for the 
inexperienced or lazy prosecutor—two high-risk categories for 
negligent nondisclosure.  Thus, say the soft rules proponents, harder 
rules might lead to under-disclosure.  Finally, in response to the 
assertion that open file policies are hard guidelines that insure against 
under-disclosure, a number of group members argued that this view 
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downplays the negative consequences of open file policies, emphasizing 
in particular the collateral consequences to witnesses of broad 
disclosure—from jeopardized security, to simple embarrassment at the 
revelation of intimate or private details that are known to investigators 
and otherwise have no bearing on a criminal case. 
 
2.     A Hybrid Approach: Soft Rules with Commentary 
 
A majority of the group viewed a combination of hard and soft 
elements as the optimal approach to written disclosure guidelines. 
Broad mandatory provisions could be accompanied by comments 
providing specific examples of circumstances where disclosure should 
and should not be made, which would be intended to guide prosecutors’ 
discretion in applying the general mandatory principles.  For example, 
the above-stated example of a soft guideline could be enacted as 
follows: “All prosecutors must promptly disclose to defense counsel all 
evidence or information that reasonably tends to undermine guilt or 
severity of punishment, or that tends materially to discredit a witness 
called by the prosecution at trial.”  That mandatory rule would be 
accompanied by comments that provided hard exemplary applications, 
such as the following: “In a robbery prosecution involving three 
eyewitnesses, two of whom testified, physical descriptions inconsistent 
with the defendant that were provided by the non-testifying witness 
were held to be subject to disclosure.”  Such guidelines would thus be 
similar in form and effect to the canon and commentary structure of 
codes of conduct for the judiciary.63  Finally, written guidelines should 
direct consultation with appropriate supervisory individuals in order to 
confer regarding uncertainty in application. 
With regard to the development of guideline comments, and in 
particular the issue of what sources they should draw from, two 
potential approaches were contemplated: examples taken from or based 
upon practice experiences within the office, or discovery-related 
holdings in judicial opinions.  Several positive and cautionary features 
of each view should be considered. 
Comments developed from experience have a number of 
advantages that derive from their context specificity.  Office- and 
jurisdiction-specific applications of the discovery guidelines permit 
direction to be tailored to the day-to-day discovery situations that line 
 
 63 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2004), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/pream_term.html#PREAMBLE (describing “Canons” and 
“specific rules set forth in Sections under each Canon” as “authoritative,” and indicating that 
“Commentary” is meant to “provide[] guidance with respect to the purpose and meaning of the 
Canons and Sections[,] . . . [but] is not intended as a statement of additional rules”). 
GROUP REPORTS.31-6 8/9/2010  8:51:56 PM 
2010]     REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUPS  2017 
prosecutors actually face.  Practice-derived comments might be tailored 
and targeted by unit supervisors to reflect the experiences of particular 
divisions within offices.  Imagine, for example, a dedicated sexual 
assault unit, or narcotics division, or task force developing comments 
that reflect particular types of evidence, police forms, witness safety 
issues, or other special concerns faced by the particular group.  
Furthermore, directing prosecutors to follow the real-life examples of 
colleagues and supervisors in discovery furthers the goal of signaling 
that the culture of the organization is supportive of positive and 
appropriate disclosure practices.  The flip side of these positive features, 
however, is that practice-derived comments might be too context-
specific to provide the desired level of guidance.  Relatedly, practice-
based discovery guidance runs the risk of being susceptible to multiple 
interpretations of the correct, preferred, or acceptable approach, 
undermining the goal of the comments in providing hard guidance to 
supplement the soft principles. 
Judicial opinions, by contrast, have all the advantages of hardness: 
They point prosecutors to the mandatory outer bounds of discretionary 
application of the office’s guidelines.  On the other hand, the 
retrospective character of judicial opinions on discovery matters could 
limit or complicate their utility as guideposts for prosecutors, since they 
are often generated by appellate courts that ask whether evidence is 
material in light of the full record developed through, and perhaps 
subsequent to, trial.  Prosecutors making prospective judgments about 
disclosure obviously lack the benefit of such hindsight.  But more 
importantly, supervising prosecutors within the group felt that line 
prosecutors should not be encouraged to weigh materiality-type 
questions, and should instead be guided to base disclosure decisions 
simply on the character of evidence at issue—i.e., its exculpatory or 
impeaching nature.  Therefore, if judicial opinions are utilized as the 
basis for guideline comments, care should be taken in the selection and 
presentation of courts’ holdings so as not to suggest that the 
retrospective materiality considerations are appropriate factors in 
prospectively assessing disclosure. 
Finally, advocates of the soft-rules-with-comments model felt that, 
even accounting for the perceived limitations of a full hard guidelines 
regime, targeted hardening might nevertheless be desirable.  One arena 
generated the most discussion and the broadest consensus in this regard: 
The principle that more junior prosecutors benefit from harder 
disclosure rules garnered the support of even those group members who 
expressed skepticism about written guidelines as a general matter.  New 
prosecutors were broadly viewed as not only unfamiliar with their 
discovery obligations, but also systematically disposed to be reluctant 
to disclose evidence.  Thus, they are a particularly high risk group for 
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accidental nondisclosure.  Moreover, from the standpoint of 
effectiveness, while more experienced attorneys might be viewed as apt 
to chafe under specific mandates that constrain the discretion they 
ordinary enjoy in the management of their cases, younger attorneys 
were viewed as wanting closer and more specific guidance.  
Prosecutors’ offices might therefore consider enacting harder, rule-
based disclosure obligations that are specifically targeted to early-career 
prosecutors—for example, by promulgating such rules within 
misdemeanor divisions, or with respect to low-level felony cases 
typically staffed by newly promoted attorneys. 
 
3.     Checklists 
 
As either a variation on or supplement to written guidelines for 
disclosure, the regulatory device of a discovery “checklist” garnered 
considerable support within the group.64  The idea draws significantly 
upon lessons from the medical field: In response to mounting evidence 
over the last decade that a large number of preventable errors were 
attributable to mistake or negligence in the performance of routine care 
functions, hospitals began to develop and utilize checklist forms to 
govern a variety of patient care protocols, and provide real-time 
monitoring of compliance with good practices.  The experience of 
hospitals has been that effective checklists, i.e., those that successfully 
reduced errors or bad outcomes in patient care, had three essential 
attributes: (1) They reduced a multi-step procedure to a series of 
discrete, mandatory tasks to be completed (e.g., “wash hands prior to 
examining patient”); (2) they were completed concurrently with the 
tasks, to force real-time rather than post hoc confirmation that a task has 
occurred; and (3) they were completed by a third party—typically a 
nurse who observed and confirmed a doctor’s performance of a given 
task by literally checking the appropriate box, and who had the 
authority and obligation to halt the process if a checklist task was not 
performed.65 
 
 64 The use of discovery checklists garnered considerable support from several of the other 
Working Groups.  See supra Part II.A.2 to A.3 (Working Group on the Disclosure Process) 
(reaching consensus on prosecutors’ use of checklists and agreeing on the advantages of police 
officers’ use of investigative checklists); supra Part IV.B.3 (Working Group on Systems and 
Culture) (discussing the use of checklists in written guidance memoranda provided by prosecutors 
to promote a culture of better disclosure in their offices); infra Part VI.B.7 (Working Group on 
External Regulation) (supporting “unanimously . . . the idea of checklists” for prosecutors to 
detail what is being disclosed and “a privilege log that lists what is withheld”). 
 65 For a recent popular account of the adoption of checklists in the medical field, see Claudia 
Dreifus, A Conversation with Dr. Peter J. Pronovost—Doctor Leads Quest for Safer Ways to 
Care for Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2010, at D2 (discussing implementation of checklists at 
Johns Hopkins Hospital). 
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It must be emphasized that neither the medical and criminal justice 
fields as a whole, nor the patient care and criminal discovery contexts in 
particular, are entirely analogous.  Three primary and overarching 
difficulties with the medical analogy were discussed by the group.66  
First, while the hospital and the criminal justice system are similar in 
that there are multiple players whose interrelated actions all bear upon 
the task of disclosure, the two fields might differ in the extent to which 
those multiple players are united in goal and motivation.  Thus, several 
participants expressed the sense that while doctors, nurses, pharmacists, 
and other medical professionals all have a shared goal of achieving 
patient wellness and avoiding patient harm, police, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, and even judges may have divergent motivations—even if all 
can agree that, for example, a wrongful arrest or conviction is an event 
unequivocally to be avoided. 
Second, several group members observed that, while the medical 
field has collected a significant amount of data on incidents of errors in 
patient care, the criminal justice system has little in the way of 
analogous empirical knowledge of the prevalence of discovery errors.  
Accordingly, we are less able to fashion evidence-based rules and 
practices—or, for that matter, to agree on whether there is any 
appreciable problem of nondisclosure that might need to be addressed.  
Third, and finally, hospitals are incentivized to utilize checklists and 
other internal regulatory mechanisms by substantial monitoring from 
external (e.g., government) and quasi-internal (e.g., boards of directors) 
entities that require data on patient care outcomes.  Prosecutors’ offices, 
by contrast, have very little if any comparable, systemic outside 
oversight, which enhances the difficulty of justifying the financial and 
bureaucratic costs of implementing comparable systems.67 
Nevertheless, group members on the whole viewed checklists as a 
feasible and beneficial approach to internal regulation of discovery.  
(Indeed, similar though more limited measures to document the 
disclosure process had been successfully instituted in one jurisdiction 
represented within the group: In conjunction with the office’s open file 
policy, prosecutors were required to log the occurrence and date of 
evidentiary disclosure.)  The checklist should enumerate either specific 
documents and items of evidence (e.g., forms by name or number, 
officer memo books), categories of documents and evidence (e.g., 
police reports, recorded witness statements, lineup forms), or a 
combination thereof, which are required to be disclosed to the defense; 
a checkmark would be made upon disclosure, perhaps with annotation 
 
 66 See infra Part V.A.3.c for further discussion of potential complications in applying lessons 
from the medical model to the criminal justice field, in particular the problem of finding an 
analog to the “nurse in the room” to serve as a third party checker. 
 67 See infra Part VI (Working Group on External Regulation). 
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of the date or other relevant details of the disclosure event.  Checklists 
should also enumerate tasks associated with and essential to good 
discovery practices but not involving the hand-over of evidence—in 
particular, consultation with law enforcement, and consultation with 
supervisors within the office.  Checklists could be developed for office-
wide use, or could be targeted at particular divisions where the need for 
or feasibility of hard oversight is particular high—for example, in 
misdemeanor divisions where prosecutors are typically less 
experienced, and cases are typically less document-intensive.68 
The group’s general embrace of the checklist device carried several 
important implementation-related caveats. 
 
a.     The Dangers of Suboptimally Inclusive Checklists 
 
Perhaps the greatest challenge posed by the implementation of 
discovery checklists is the development of the list itself.  If the primary 
goals are seen as (1) informing prosecutors about how to effectuate 
disclosure, and (2) minimizing accidental nondisclosure by forcing 
prosecutors to confirm execution of disclosure tasks, then it is clear that 
an under-inclusive checklist, or one that lists items at too great a level of 
generality, will be ineffective.  Equally ineffective, however, might be 
the over-inclusive checklist.  Consider, for example, the prosecutor 
facing a list of discovery tasks, only forty percent of which are actually 
applicable to her case.  The busy or lazy attorney might well respond to 
such a situation by internalizing a disregard of the list, and simply 
falling back on habit or other informal discovery customs.  This, too, 
would defeat the list’s value. 
Hence, checklists must be prepared with great care—optimally, in 
collaboration with not only division supervisors within a prosecutors’ 
office, but also with law enforcement representatives who are most 
knowledgeable about the nature of information that is flowing from 
their agencies.69  Additionally, office-wide checklists might be tailored 
by supervisors within particular divisions, to enumerate specific 
documents or evidence that are typically and uniquely gathered and 
disclosed in their cases. 
 
 68 Some group members observed that as checklists are more closely tailored and specialized 
within particular offices, they are less useful as auditing devices to generate data on comparative 
discovery practices across prosecutors’ offices.  Policymakers should be aware of that dynamic, 
although the broader question of whether and to what extent external auditing or regulation is 
desirable is beyond the scope of the group’s agenda.  See, e.g., infra Part VI (Working Group on 
External Regulation). 
 69 See infra Part V.A.4 for further discussion of inter-agency relationships. 
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b.     Harnessing Technology to Enable Concurrent  
and Real-Time Checklists 
 
Lessons from the medical model point to the importance of 
checklists being completed in real time: Completion of a specific event 
must be confirmed concurrent with its performance, rather than at the 
end of an entire process, in order best to prevent accidental omission of 
a step in the process.  Within the criminal justice field, existing case 
tracking systems, which increasingly are computer-based, can and 
should be adapted to facilitate the use of such concurrent checklists.  
For example, several group members noted that calendaring and 
document-management software utilized by their offices could be 
utilized to set checklist tasks, assign deadlines, and require real-time 
confirmation of completion. 
 
c.     Putting a Nurse in the Room 
 
The medical checklist model depended significantly on “putting a 
nurse in the room,” i.e., separating responsibility for performing a given 
task (usually lodged with the doctor) from responsibility for confirming 
the task’s completion on the checklist (usually lodged with a nurse).  
The division of labor provides an additional check against accidental (or 
even more deliberate) failures of protocol.  The group discussed a 
number of practical limitations to this dynamic in criminal discovery.  
In the day-to-day work of a prosecutor’s office, the assignment of a 
“nurse” to each prosecutor for real-time checklist management is 
unlikely to be feasible from a resource perspective (and of debatable 
value from a training perspective). 
Further reflection by group members after the Symposium elicited 
an additional point, related to the potential limitations of checklists in 
general.70  While some tasks performed by prosecutors in relation to 
their disclosure obligations are discrete, many are more time-intensive, 
more complex, and more dependent upon a prosecutor’s judgment—and 
therefore possibly less amenable to real-time oversight and verification 
by a third party.  An exemplary contrast in tasks might be, “Meet with 
case agent; request file, notes, and physical evidence” (discrete, 
relatively easily verifiable), versus, “Review agent notes for 
discrepancies with reports” (protracted, dependent upon a series of 
complex judgments internal to a prosecutor’s mind).  While offices 
should construct checklists with an eye to distilling these broad and 
 
 70 See supra Part V.A.3.a. 
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evaluative processes to their smallest and most readily verifiable 
constituent parts, there may be discovery tasks which must be included 
in the checklist in the interest of comprehensiveness, but are simply not 
susceptible to further reduction in complexity.  Thus, as a checklist 
grows more comprehensive, including not only ministerial tasks but 
also critical evaluative steps in the disclosure process, some categories 
of action might not be readily and meaningfully verifiable by an 
individual who lacks legal expertise (such as a supervisor) or who 
stands outside of a prosecutor’s mental processes (essentially any third 
party). 
Nevertheless, the metaphor of a nurse in the room gained 
significant traction within the group’s discussions of how checklists 
might be executed.  There are players in the criminal justice system 
who can serve as “nurses,” and might be affirmatively incorporated into 
the process of utilizing checklists.  Supervisors, of course, should 
confirm their subordinates’ use of the checklists.  Courts and even 
defense attorneys could be provided with the checklists, using the 
process to create a clear record of disclosure at the trial level (thus 
avoiding problematic reconstruction hearings in the event of an 
appellate issue) and simultaneously to confirm a prosecutor’s 
compliance with the checklist device.  And, to a certain extent, the 
above-discussed technological adaptations can serve as virtual nurses, to 
the extent that computer-based case management systems are designed 
to require and record real-time verification of checklist compliance.  
Some group members suggested that something closer to the nurse 
model—a dedicated second set of eyes on the checklist process—might 
be systematically instituted in particular types of cases identified as 
being at high risk for discovery deviations or disputes.  Others, 
however, countered that such measures might inappropriately miss the 
more routine discovery judgments or misjudgments that are made in 
unremarkable cases, particularly by more junior prosecutors. 
Finally, in selecting appropriate “nurses,” attention must be given 
to the above-discussed concern that, as discovery tasks grow less 
ministerial and more dependent upon intellectual judgments, the 
universe of individuals who can perform meaningful verification 
becomes more limited.  Paralegals, for example, might be well-suited to 
verify more ministerial tasks; individuals with greater legal expertise, 
such as supervisors, would likely be required to verify more complex 
disclosure processes and events. 
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4.     Guidelines for Inter-Agency Interaction 
 
Group members agreed that an important consideration in 
formulating discovery guidelines internal to prosecutors’ offices is the 
extent to which inter-agency interaction should be addressed by those 
guidelines—in particular, interaction with the law enforcement 
departments within the office’s jurisdiction.71  The discovery context is 
of course only one of many areas in which prosecutors and law 
enforcement must coordinate efforts in a criminal case, but it is one of 
the most vital.  Prosecutors are charged with effectuating disclosure 
obligations, and are hampered in doing so in a complete and timely 
manner if they do not receive evidence and information that is gathered 
by and known to police investigators.72  Hence, the relationship between 
prosecutors and law enforcement, and the procedures for ensuring 
information flow between those actors, are central to the discovery 
practices of a prosecutors’ office. 
At the same time, developing constructive and productive 
relationships with law enforcement can be one of the most difficult 
aspects of the prosecutor’s job.  There is a strong perception among 
prosecutors that law enforcement organizations and actors operate 
within a different institutional culture, and under different and 
sometimes incompatible incentives in regard to discovery. This 
complicates the task of convincing police of the need to assist in 
fulfilling the obligation of full and timely disclosure of evidence by 
promptly providing prosecutors with all that they have gathered and 
generated in a case—especially when, as is often the case, the 
prosecutor lacks full knowledge of the investigative and documentation 
practices of a given officer or law enforcement agency.  Moreover, 
these challenges are felt particularly intensely by early-career 
prosecutors—those already most susceptible to mistaken nondisclosure.  
For the junior prosecutor, these difficulties are commonly exacerbated 
by unfamiliarity and lack of confidence as to her own discovery 
 
 71 Offices will vary, of course, in the extent to which they routinely deal with one or multiple 
law enforcement offices.  District attorneys’ offices are frequently county-based, while police 
departments are often (though not always) organized at the municipal level; furthermore, a given 
county might be comprised of both municipal police forces and county-based sheriffs’ offices.  
Therefore, prosecutors in a single district attorney’s office might regularly receive cases from 
multiple law enforcement organizations.  At the federal level, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices deal not 
only with multiple federal law enforcement agencies—e.g., the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives—but also frequently interface with local law enforcement within their districts. 
 72 Conversely, police are only one, albeit the most prominent, example of other players in the 
criminal justice system from whom prosecutors must routinely obtain information that might be 
encompassed by disclosure obligations.  Other examples could include crime laboratory and 
medical examiner personnel. 
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obligations, inexperience in navigating the potential gulf in motivations 
and incentives animating the prosecutorial and law enforcement roles, 
and the power imbalance that can exist between a young attorney and a 
more experienced police officer or detective. 
For all of these reasons, it is desirable for internal discovery 
guidelines to affirmatively address the manner in which prosecutors 
should work with law enforcement actors throughout the life of a 
criminal case to obtain in a timely matter the evidence and information 
that will be subject to disclosure obligations.  Written guidelines should 
provide for an initial meeting with law enforcement early in the case, 
and should direct prosecutors to explain the disclosure obligations under 
which they operate, to emphasize importance of full and forthright 
disclosure from police in the process, and to request immediate access 
to the documents or information that the law enforcement agency has 
typically generated by that stage in the case.  Guidelines should also 
mandate that prosecutors follow up with law enforcement closer to trial 
to ensure that all evidence and information in the case has been 
received.  To the extent discovery checklists are adopted, these 
meetings with law enforcement should be included on the checklist.  
Additionally, the checklists should be shared and discussed at the initial 
meeting to determine whether they accurately and completely reflect the 
documents and processes that are utilized by the relevant law 
enforcement agency.  All documentation processes within that agency 
must be ascertained by the prosecutor and, as appropriate, added to an 
updated checklist. 
Group members generally felt that in addition to formal guidance, 
prosecutors also needed to be encouraged to develop informal contacts 
within law enforcement organizations—trusted individuals in 
prosecutors’ offices and police departments who could assist in 
negotiating potential conflicts over discovery issues specifically or 
pretrial coordination issues more generally.  Several individuals noted 
the importance in their own careers of having those relationships 
themselves, or of being able to turn to experienced mavens within their 
offices who could share their own cross-institutional relationships. 
Two caveats should be emphasized.  First, while a functional 
working relationship between prosecutors and law enforcement is 
essential to effective discovery practices, prosecutorial independence is 
an important competing concern.  In light of the need for prosecutors to 
evaluate the quality and credibility of evidence (including, for example, 
the credibility of police witnesses), and the legality and propriety of 
police conduct (including, for example, searches or witness contacts), 
their ability to objectively and critically assess the conduct of law 
enforcement actors must not compromised. 
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Second, while regulating prosecutor-police interactions at the line 
level is a necessary condition of effective discovery practices, it is not a 
sufficient one.  Law enforcement agencies are structured around their 
own chains of command, and officers will be most responsive not to the 
urgings of outside agencies, but rather to the signals sent by their own 
leadership.  As one group member expressed the dilemma, if a police 
officer is backed by supervisors saying she does not have to disclose 
documents, then she is unlikely to disclose the items regardless of the 
prosecutor’s request for them.  Therefore, command-level leadership, 
and in particular coordination across the top levels of the prosecutor and 
police organizations, is essential.  Leadership within prosecutors’ 
offices must work closely with their command-level law enforcement 
counterparts to ensure that both organizations have strong and 
coordinated internal policies and procedures with regard to 
documentation and disclosure of evidence in criminal investigations and 
prosecutions.73 
 
5.     Public Access to Internal Discovery Guidelines 
 
To the extent prosecutors’ offices promulgate written guidelines to 
internally regulate discovery practices, these guidelines are likely to be 
public records, accessible through whatever freedom-of-information 
channels exist in a given jurisdiction.  This is the case, for example, 
with regard to the Department of Justice’s United States Attorneys 
Manual, which is publicly accessible via the electronic Freedom of 
Information Act Reading Room.74 The experience of federal 
prosecutors’ offices has been that this public access to office policies 
has not been problematic, particularly since the policies themselves 
create no enforceable rights. 
In light of the fact that some level of public access to internal 
discovery regulations is almost certainly inevitable, prosecutors’ offices 
might consider making affirmative efforts to publicize its disclosure 
policies—by, for example, posting them on the office’s web site.75  
Such a symbolic gesture of transparency would have the advantage of, 
again, communicating a leadership-level message concerning the 
 
 73 Such internal policies were unheard of within police organizations until relatively recently.  
The International Association of Chiefs of Police—the leading professional association of police 
administrators—developed a model disclosure policy in 2009.  INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF 
POLICE, BRADY DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS MODEL POLICY (2009).  While some large 
departments have implemented such policies, they remain extremely rare. 
 74 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL (U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1997), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/index.html. 
 75 See, e.g., TRAVIS COUNTY DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, DISCOVERY POLICY FOR CRIMINAL 
CASES (2008), available at http://www.traviscountyda.com/published/discoverypolicyfinal.pdf. 
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office’s commitment to positive discovery norms, and might, 
particularly in a time of increasing concern about the risks of wrongful 
convictions, enhance the good faith extended to the office by the public 
and the defense bar. 
 
B.     Audits and Oversight 
 
Prosecutors’ offices should adopt prospective auditing 
mechanisms that provide for routine oversight of disclosure obligations, 
and generate data that can be used to improve development of and 
compliance with those guidelines. 
 
A natural and necessary corollary to the development of written 
discovery guidelines is oversight of compliance with those guidelines.  
The group reached consensus on the general principle that rules 
standing alone are not sufficient to ensure full compliance with 
discovery obligations, and that some mechanism to audit and oversee 
compliance is necessary to prevent both deliberate and, perhaps more 
importantly, unintentional instances of inappropriate nondisclosure. 
 
1.     The Importance of Prospective Auditing 
 
The mechanism of an “audit” could be understood in a variety of 
ways.  One increasingly debated auditing device in the criminal justice 
system is the retrospective audit—usually in response to a 
determination that an error was made, often a wrongful conviction.  
Retrospective audits of this sort might be conducted on an ad hoc 
basis,76 or by dedicated units established within prosecutors’ offices.77  
While extremely valuable for the information they can generate about 
the nature of and reasons for erroneous prosecutions, such efforts to 
reconstruct criminal investigations and prosecutions, often years after 
their conclusion, are extremely time consuming and expensive.  As 
such, they are beyond the means of many if not most prosecutors’ 
 
 76 LESLIE CROCKER SNYDER ET AL., REPORT ON THE CONVICTION OF JEFFREY DESKOVIC 
(2007), available at http://www.westchesterda.net/Jeffrey%20Deskovic%20Comm%20Rpt.pdf 
(reviewing investigation and prosecution of DNA exoneree through independent panel assembled 
at request of Westchester County District Attorney); TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, 
N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE NEW YORK BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK 
FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS (2009), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/ 
ContentFolders/TaskForceonWrongfulConvictions/TFWrongfulConvictionsreport.pdf (reviewing 
fifty-three New York exonerations). 
 77 See, e.g., Dallas County District Attorney’s Office, Conviction Integrity Unit, 
www.dallasda.com/conviction-integrity.html (last visited June 9, 2010). 
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offices in the United States, which, with the significant exceptions of 
the Department of Justice and a select number of large jurisdictions, are 
overwhelmingly small offices operating with extremely limited 
budgets.78 
Some mechanism of prospective auditing, however, is available to 
most, if not all offices.  Crucially, such mechanisms can and should be 
instituted as a routine matter, not prompted by error or reflective of 
blame, but rather viewed as standard management tools for obtaining 
information that can be utilized to improve the performance of 
prosecutors who want to serve the organizational mission.  Furthermore, 
prospective auditing of this sort is necessary in order to effectively craft 
the organization’s written discovery guidelines. Data on what current 
practices are and where errors are commonly made are essential for a 
variety of purposes—including, for example, the development of 
comments to accompany soft guidelines, knowing if such comments 
need to be better tailored, or determining whether soft guidelines need 
to be hardened in particular areas of practice or for particular subsets of 
prosecutors (e.g., junior members of the office). 
Finally, and consistent with other aspects of internal regulation 
discussed by the group, it bears emphasis that the existence of an 
auditing mechanism of this sort is important in and of itself to signal 
and develop an organizational culture that is conducive to effective 
discovery practices.  It conveys a top-level commitment to integrity and 
evidence-based best practices, and, when implemented as a routine and 
non-punitive program, reinforces the commitment of the office not to 
second-guessing the judgment of its attorneys, but to supporting their 
professional development and success. 
 
2.     Realistic Possibilities for Prospective Auditing Mechanisms 
 
The group was perhaps most sensitive in this arena to the absence 
of a viable one-size-fits-all approach, and to the desirability of 
programmatic proposals that were realistic and generally accessible—
rather than refining the contours of best auditing practices.  To that end, 
the group discussed and favorably viewed several prospective auditing 
ideas that could be implemented by most prosecution offices. 
First, group members observed that the vast majority of 
prosecutors’ offices have some mechanism for routine monitoring of 
ongoing cases.  Examples include supervisor check-in correlating with 
speedy trial deadlines, supervisor approval for negotiated pleas, or inter-
 
 78 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 61, at 3 (identifying the median size of 
prosecutors’ offices as employing only nine attorneys, though also revealing the wide variation 
among large, medium, and small offices in the United States). 
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division consultation that occurs when a case is handed off from a grand 
jury unit to a trial unit.  At any of those already-existing points of 
contact between supervisory and subordinate prosecutors, or between 
coequal attorneys, a discovery check could be formally institutionalized 
as an auditing mechanism.  Regardless of whether an office has already 
institutionalized procedures that lend themselves to incorporating 
discovery oversight, random prospective spot checks could be 
performed by supervisors. 
If the office has written guidelines, the check could consist of a 
formal confirmation that each guideline and procedure had been 
followed.  If the office has adopted a discovery checklist, that checklist 
could be reviewed and confirmed by the supervisor or colleague. 
In all events, auditing and oversight should not only check 
discovery compliance, but should also generate and preserve data.  This 
is critical notwithstanding the understandable concern that the push to 
identify error or wrongdoing may drive a wedge between supervisors 
and their subordinates—the consequence of which is to discourage line 
prosecutors from openly and honestly seeking guidance.  While the 
message must be conveyed that auditing is being pursued for 
organizational benefit and not to persecute, information collection and 
maintenance is the only way for organizational trends to be identified, 
and for discovery guidelines, supervision, and training to develop 
effectively.79 
Discovery checklists may offer prosecutors’ offices additional 
benefits in this arena.  Here again, lessons can be learned from the 
medical arena.  Hospital managers were initially daunted by the 
challenge of how to identify and fix errors in complex and multi-
factored processes such as disease diagnosis and treatment.  The 
development of checklists helped the hospitals to break down those 
processes, identify and track discrete errors within them (by, for 
example, tracking every instance where a nurse had to remind a doctor 
to perform a given step), and then analyze whether those discrete errors 
represented a trend that needed to be remedied at the organizational 
level.  Similarly with regard to discovery checklists, offices could 
record and track any instance where a disclosure task was delayed or 
not completed, and could use that data to determine, for example, 
whether further internal training was required, or whether an 
information flow breakdown had occurred between law enforcement 
 
 79 Further reflection by group members following the Symposium raised the concern that 
internally generated data about discovery practices and compliance could be discoverable in civil 
law suits—regardless of whether an individual prosecutor or a prosecutor’s office is named as a 
party to the suit (an eventuality that will frequently, though not always, be precluded through 
absolute immunity or Eleventh Amendment immunity).  This points to concerns about the role of 
external regulation and oversight—an area which was, in the main, beyond the scope of the 
group’s agenda.  See infra Part VI (Working Group on External Regulation). 
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and prosecutors.  The possibility of facilitating this type of routine 
monitoring should be considered by prosecutors’ offices in deliberations 
on whether and how to adopt checklists.80 
Finally, the group was concerned that very small prosecutors’ 
offices might be prevented from pursuing any effective auditing or 
oversight not only by general resource constraints but also by an 
insufficient staff for any independent monitoring of a case.  In small 
offices with, for example, only one or two prosecutors staffing an entire 
“unit” (e.g., felony prosecutions) there may be no internal staff member 
who can review a case without the inherent conflict of passing judgment 
on her own work.  In other words, many offices lack the capacity to put 
a nurse in the room.  In such circumstances, offices might consider 
regional collaborations, or drawing upon the resources of local or state 
district attorney associations to set up quasi-external auditing on a 
routine prospective basis, or at a minimum, to have an established 
mechanism for independent retrospective monitoring. 
 
VI.     EXTERNAL REGULATION: REPORTED BY COOKIE RIDOLFI81 
 
The Working Group on External Regulation addressed the question 
of whether, how, and to what extent, courts, disciplinary authorities, and 
other external bodies should regulate Brady disclosure obligations and 
correlative ethics rules.  The group was charged with exploring the 
 
 80 Further reflection and discussion by group members after the Symposium generated the 
additional insight that checklists may be most useful as internal auditing devices if they reflect a 
high degree of standardization within an office, because this provides maximum data for 
comparison of compliance rates across divisions or branch offices. 
 81 Discussion Leader: Jane Campbell Moriarty, Professor of Law and Director of Faculty 
Research and Development, The University of Akron School of Law; Reporter: Kathleen 
“Cookie” Ridolfi, Professor of Law and Director of the Northern California Innocence Project, 
Santa Clara University School of Law.  Other members of the Working Group on External 
Regulation included: Robin L. Baker, Executive Deputy Attorney General for Criminal Justice, 
New York; Hon. Phylis S. Bamberger, retired, New York Court of Claims, Supreme Court, Bronx 
County, New York; Anthony Barkow, Executive Director, Center on the Administration of 
Criminal Law, New York University School of Law; Stephanie Batcheller, Staff Attorney, New 
York State Defenders Association; Hon. Joel L. Blumenfeld, Acting Justice, Supreme Court, 
Queens County, New York; Mady J. Edelstein, Principle Attorney, Departmental Disciplinary 
Committee, Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, New York; Brian Gillette, Assistant 
Prosecutor, Middlesex County, New Jersey; Anthony J. Girese, Counsel to the District Attorney, 
Bronx County, New York; Tracy L. Kepler, Senior Counsel, Director at Large, National 
Organization of Bar Counsel; Wendy Lehmann, retired, Chief of Appeals, District Attorney’s 
Office, Monroe County, New York; Donald R. Lundberg, Past President, National Organization 
of Bar Counsel, Executive Secretary, Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission; Amanda 
Masters, civil rights attorney, Giskan Solotaroff Anderson & Stewart LLP; Norman L. Reimer, 
Executive Director, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Hon. Michael R. 
Sonberg, Acting Justice, Supreme Court, New York County, New York; and Peter J. Tomao, 
New York criminal defense attorney. 
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effectiveness of existing external systems in ensuring compliance with 
legal standards imposed by law and disciplinary authorities; to examine 
the role of state and federal disciplinary committees, judicial oversight, 
and judicial reporting in the process; and to consider the need for 
improvement in these systems.  The group also considered proposals to 
improve compliance with disclosure obligations including mandatory 
disclosure conferences, mandatory reporting to disciplinary committees, 
and prosecutorial compliance statements. 
The discussion leader, Jane Moriarty, opened the meeting by 
putting questions on the board aimed at identifying areas where there 
would be broad agreement and the areas, range, and depth of 
disagreements among the group.82  The goal was to generate an open 
dialogue that could lead to further discourse and reflection to ultimately 
enhancing the fairness of the system. 
 
A.     Current Disciplinary Standards 
 
With the exception of ABA Model Rules, the group did not 
address specific rules and standards.  For clarity, the group 
distinguished the regulation of Brady compliance, where the focus is 
materiality and due process, from the ethical obligations imposed by 
rules regulating ethics and professional conduct.83  The use of the term 
“Brady” in this Part refers to both.  People uniformly agreed that the 
 
 82 The questions and answers were as follows: 
1.  What one thing do you believe everyone in this diverse group can agree on? 
 Answers: 
  External regulation is necessary. 
  Disciplinary agencies have a key role to play in regulation. 
  There is not complete overlap between Brady obligations and ethical  obligations. 
  It is essential that police conduct also be externally regulated. 
  The judiciary has a critical role—both at the trial and appellate level. 
  The prosecutor’s culture that must be reinforced is “do justice, not just win cases.” 
  Disclosure of both exculpatory and mitigating evidence is essential. 
2.  What is one issue you believe will generate significant controversy? 
  Answers: 
   The stage at which disclosure must occur. 
   The nature of what should be disclosed. 
   Publishing the names of errant prosecutors in the appellate opinions. 
   Time spent by courts.  Is all this really worth it? 
 83 The standards for decisions about Brady violations as a matter of criminal procedure are 
different from the ethical standards.  First, the ethics rules do not require defendants to request the 
material; rather, there is an ethical obligation on prosecutors to disclose with or without a request.  
Second, the disclosure under the ethical rules has a timeliness requirement.  Third, Brady has a 
materiality requirement, unlike the ethics rules.  And fourth, the Brady duty runs to the State 
generally, whereas the ethical duty is personal to the prosecutor and is only triggered to the extent 
the prosecutor knows of information that tends to negate guilt or mitigate the offense.  For more 
on the difference between the two, see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal 
Op. 454 (2009). 
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rules and regulations in place now are not doing enough because they 
are inadequate and sometimes not enforced at all.  There was strong 
consensus that more and better external regulation is needed. 
The prosecutors at the table said that a big problem for them is law 
enforcement.  Police officers are not always cooperative and fail to turn 
over discovery even to them.  The group agreed that this is a serious 
problem and needs to be corrected.  The group stressed the need for 
regulations governing police conduct in the discovery process in the 
form of specific rules that direct the police to turn everything over to 
prosecutor in a timely manner. 
 
B.     A Bigger Role for the Courts 
 
The group spent a lot of time talking about how much more could 
be achieved if the courts were more directly involved in monitoring the 
discovery process.  Judges should have a central role in ensuring that 
the attorneys practicing before them are abiding by the rules and ethics 
of the profession.  This should be happening at pretrial, at trial, and 
through the appellate process.  The group talked about ideas for what 
could be done to make the system better and understood that scarcity of 
resources was an important consideration in deciding whether to 
implement any of the proposals. 
 
1.     Mandatory Pretrial Conferences 
 
Everyone in the group agreed that at pretrial conferences, judges 
can do a lot more to force compliance with Brady and overall to 
improve the discovery process.  All agreed that pretrial discovery 
conferences should be mandatory.  One of the problems frequently 
referred to in the session was a culture of nondisclosure among some 
prosecutors in some offices.  A more active role by judges in overseeing 
the process can help promote a culture of disclosure.84 
 
 84 The ABA Criminal Justice Section has created a Draft Recommendation on the Judicial 
Role in Avoiding Wrongful Convictions, which provides: 
Resolved: That the American Bar Association urges federal, state, local and territorial 
governments to reduce the risk of convicting the innocent, while increasing the 
likelihood of convicting the guilty, by adopting the following practice: Prior to trial, 
courts should conduct a conference to resolve issues of turnover during which the 
prosecutor and defense counsel shall certify that they have delivered all required 
documents to the other party. 
STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE  
SECTION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES NO. 102D (2010), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/midyear2010/102d.pdf. 
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2.     Mitigating Evidence 
 
The group agreed it would be a good idea that judges make clear 
that a prosecutor’s duty under Brady includes disclosure not only of 
exculpatory evidence but mitigating evidence too. 
 
3.     Judicially Imposed Deadlines and Vertical Case Assignment 
 
Members of the group suggested that the court impose deadlines at 
the outset of a case for when material had to be turned over.  Judges in 
the group suggested that judges would be better equipped to monitor the 
discovery process if cases were assigned vertically, with one judge 
overseeing a case from beginning to end.  The judge would also be able 
to take action to enforce the deadlines if that became necessary. 
 
4.     Affirmation and Certification 
 
Most of the group thought that prosecutors should be required to 
affirm on the record and/or by written certification that they have turned 
over all Brady material.85 
 
5.     Reminder Rule 
 
Members of the group said that judges should remind prosecutors 
that obligations under Brady are continuous and that discovery must be 
turned over as soon as they get it.  Since prosecutors often get 
discoverable material after the trial has started, it would be a good idea 
for judges to periodically remind them of the obligations under Brady 
and have them reaffirm on the record. 
 
6.     Maintain Discovery in Court File 
 
It was suggested that when prosecutors turn over discovery, they 
should be required to file copies with the court.  Maintaining a parallel 
file can alleviate disputes that may arise concerning the question of 
what was or was not turned over. 
 
 85 See also id. 
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7.     Checklist System and Privilege Log 
 
The group unanimously supported the idea of checklists.86  
Prosecutors should be asked to submit a checklist that details what is 
being turned over and a privilege log that lists what is withheld.  This 
can be done without turning over the contents of the privileged 
document. The reason for withholding should also be stated. 
 
8.     Database System 
 
People thought that subject to confidentiality requirements, a court 
database, where discovery can be uploaded and made accessible to both 
sides, would be very useful. 
 
9.     Address Problems in Real Time 
 
Brady violations and instances of prosecutorial misconduct have to 
be addressed in real time.87  Appellate opinions that find prosecutorial 
misconduct years after the violation has occurred have very little, if any, 
deterrent effect.  Prosecutors may not even be notified that their conduct 
was found improper; sometimes, those whose conduct is addressed are 
no longer even prosecutors.  The serious lag time between violations 
and disciplinary action is not a very effective way of providing either 
guidance or deterrence for active prosecutors.  Thus, the group (at the 
judges’ suggestion) thought it was exceptionally important for judges to 
be involved in regulating disclosure and doing so early in the case, 
where such involvement could short-circuit problems relating to lack of 
disclosure and would be helpful for prosecutors in making decisions 
about whether and what information should be disclosed.  Intervention 
should be as early in the process as possible.  In cases in which the 
defendant is innocent, this will also increase the likelihood that the 
defendant will benefit from the disclosure and not be convicted. 
 
 86 The use of discovery checklists garnered considerable support from several of the other 
Working Groups.  See supra Part II.A.2 to A.3 (Working Group on the Disclosure Process) 
(reaching consensus on prosecutors’ use of checklists and agreeing on the advantages of police 
officers’ use of investigative checklists); supra Part IV.B.3 (Working Group on Systems and 
Culture) (discussing the use of checklists in written guidance memoranda provided by prosecutors 
to promote a culture of better disclosure in their offices); supra Part V.A.3 (Working Group on 
Internal Regulation) (supporting the use of discovery checklists as a regulatory device). 
 87 Members objected to the use of the term “prosecutorial misconduct” because it includes 
negligent and accidental error. 
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10.     Brady Oversight Post-Trial 
 
The group considered the question of what could be done to 
regulate the disclosure of newly discovered evidence after trial. The 
question was discussed but remained open at the end of the session. 
 
11.     Judicial Reporting and Naming Prosecutors 
 
It was suggested that when a judge finds a Brady violation, that 
finding should be put on the record and the prosecutor reported to the 
state bar’s disciplinary committee. 
There was much discussion about whether it was helpful and/or 
appropriate to name prosecutors in judicial decisions.  Opinions were 
decidedly mixed and concerns were raised about allowing those who 
acted intentionally to be anonymous when they should not be; the 
potential career-ending damage this could do to a prosecutor who erred 
unintentionally; and the importance of naming prosecutors so as to 
encourage greater compliance among other prosecutors who might be 
debating whether to disclose. 
 
C.     Disciplinary Agencies 
 
The group recognized the special role and immense power 
prosecutors have in the criminal justice system and expressed concern 
that state disciplinary authorities should do more to deter abuse of 
discretion and Brady violations.  While the majority of prosecutors 
abide by their obligations, action by disciplinary authorities is needed to 
catch the outliers. 
 
D.     Deterring Nondisclosure 
 
 A prosecutorial culture of nondisclosure in some offices was cited 
as a serious problem.  To change this culture, individual prosecutors 
have to have a stake in the outcome.  Some proposed that prosecutors’ 
names be published in the opinions where misconduct is found to have 
occurred.  Some group members disagreed.  Others suggested that 
prosecutors’ names be identified only in instances where there has been 
a Brady violation and cases of intentional misconduct.  Some group 
members proposed criminal sanctions for prosecutors who willfully 
withhold exculpatory evidence.  Some warned that more stringent 
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ethical enforcement may have the opposite effect of causing the most 
unethical prosecutor to act even more unethically, perhaps even 
destroying potentially exculpatory evidence. 
 
E.     Promoting a Culture of Disclosure 
 
Promoting a culture of disclosure was a goal articulated by 
everyone in the group.  This culture has to start in the prosecutor’s 
office and be reinforced through external regulation.  Prosecutors need a 
positive stake in promoting and exercising the highest ethical standards.  
Prosecutors pointed out that negligent and intentional “misconduct” 
should not be lumped together. 
 
F.     Recommendations for Best Practices 
 
• More judicial oversight: Make judges active arbiters in 
resolving disclosure questions. 
• Checklists and privilege logs: Create and maintain a record of 
what is turned over and what is not disclosed and the reasons. 
• Plea bargaining: Discovery must be provided to the defense 
before a plea is offered. 
• Make pretrial conferences mandatory: Issues concerning 
checklists and privilege logs should be resolved at the pretrial 
conference.  Prosecutors should be required to certify that all 
known discovery has been turned over; although, everyone did 
not agree to whether an oral assertion can substitute for written 
certification.  One member was hesitant about requiring 
discovery before any plea bargaining and mandatory pretrial 
conferencing. 
• Require judicial reporting: Judicial reporting of attorney 
violations should be required to reinforce the culture of 
disclosure and deter noncompliance. 
• Vertical case assignments: Assign one judge to a case provided 
resources are available. 
• Data collection is important and more needs to be done: More 
data that can reveal how the criminal system is working and 
not working is needed. 
